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This paper examines the labor market dynamics of six CEE countries over the last 10
years, paying special attention to the nature of labor market institutions these countries have
adopted and their impact on labor market performance.  This paper finds that, compared to
EU countries, CEE countries fall in the "middle" of the flexibility scale regarding their
employment protection legislation.  While the effect of labor market institutions is hard to
uncover, it should not be disregarded and they are likely to play an important role in the
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I.  Introduction
Whether or not labor market rigidities are an important contributor to persistently high
levels  of unemployment  remains  at the center of an important  debate  in Europe.  European
labor markets are often viewed as rigid and inflexible in opposition to those in North America
where  legislation  is less  protective  of employment  and  fosters  greater  mobility.  The  fairly
high unemployment  rates that persist in numerous parts of Europe  are often attributed to these
rigidities.
The debate has taken renewed relevance  with the potential  entry of new countries  in
the  European  Union  (EU  hereafter).  As  those  countries  are  compelled  to  have  laws  and
policies  consistent with the "acquis communautaire",  an interesting  question is whether they
have  introduced  in  their  labor  markets  the  same  rigidities  that  exist  in  other  European
countries.  An even  more fundamental  question  is whether those  rigidities,  if they exist,  are
slowing  down  the  adjustment  of labor  markets  in  these  economies,  wasting  potential  for
productivity  growth and leading to a persistently high level of unemployment.  In other words,
are  Central  and Eastern  European  countries  (CEE  hereafter)  likely to  contract  a European
disease,  commonly called  "eurosclerosis"  on their way toward accession into  the EU?  Does
this disease really matter?
The paper will thus attempt to answer the following questions:
*  To what  extent  have  the CEE  countries  - which aspire  to  enter the  EU  - adopted  labor
market  institutions  (job security  provisions,  support programs  for the unemployed  and other
*  The authors will like to express their gratitude to government  officials of the Czech Republic,  Estonia,
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and Isabelle Chaal for their outstanding work processing this report.related  policies)  which make the functioning  of their labor markets  relatively inflexible  and
rigid?
*  How do their policies  and legislation compare  with those  in the  member countries of the
EU and OECD?
*  To what extent  have these institutions  shaped labor market adjustment dynamics in these
economies  during  the  transition?  How  does  the  impact  of institutions  on  labor  market
outcomes  compare  to  that  of macroeconomic  and  structural  reforms?  Have  labor  market
institutions  and policies had an impact on the effectiveness  of economic reform programs?  In
other words, to what extent do they "matter"?
In our search for answers, we examine labor market institutions during the 1  990s for a
group of EU accession countries  (i.e. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia), following the methodology  used by the OECD (1997,  1999). This allows  us to
compare our results for the CEE countries with those presented by the OECD for its member
countries,  including EU countries.  We then discuss the role played by these institutions in the
context of the ongoing  macroeconomic  and structural  reforms.  In doing  so, we relate to the
economic  literature  that  views labor market  adjustment  not uniquely  as a  function  of labor
market  institutions,  but rather  as the result of  the interaction  between  such  institutions  and
other factors outside the labor market (Blanchard and Wolfers,  1999).
We show that:
*  CEE countries, although adopting the set of policies and institutions common to European
countries, do not constitute a monolithic group. There is diversity among them and, as a result,
some  countries  have  a more flexible  labor market than others.  However,  when  compared  to
EU and OECD members, most of these countries tend to be in the middle of the 'labor market
flexibility'  scale.
*  CEE countries have experienced  tremendous changes  in their labor markets - in terms of
labor reallocation  across economic  sectors, changes in patterns of labor force participation  and
employment-to-population  ratios, and emergence  of unemployment.  These changes would not
have  taken  place  without  wide-ranging  economic  reform  programs.  Changes  in  fiscal  and
monetary  policy,  price  and  trade  liberalization,  privatization  and  introduction  of financial
regulations have had a huge impact on labor market dynamics.
2*  Even if the impact of labor market institutions  has remained modest and hard to uncover,
one should  not conclude  that they are  insignificant.  There are  a number of signs such  as low
employment creation,  a rising proportion of long-term unemployed,  specific patterns of labor
force  participation  and  the  size  of the  informal  economy  that  reflect  the  impact  of labor
market  institutions.  One  can  also  relate  differences  between  countries  to  the  diversity  of
policies and institutions.
The rest  of the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  II  presents  a  description  of
selected  labor market  institutions  in these countries  and compares  them to those in EU and
OECD  countries.  Section  III  documents  the  main  labor  market  developments.  Section  IV
discusses the macro and structural  reforms  implemented during the  1990s  and their effect  on
the labor market, compared to that of institutional changes. Finally, Section V concludes.
II.  How Flexible  Are Labor Markets in CEE Countries? An analysis of Labor Market
Institutions in the 1990s.
Measuring the degree of flexibility or rigidity of labor markets is not an easy task due to
the lack  of a  unique quantifiable  indicator  that  can  serve  as  barometer.  As pointed  out by
Freeman  (2000),  "there  is  no  generally  accepted  taxonomy  for  classifying  economies  into
different institutional  groupings, not even  a scale to measure the  distance between  particular
institutional  settings.  Are  Japanese  institutions  closer  to  those  of the  United  States  or
Germany?  Are  United  Kingdom  institutions  more  American  or  European?  We  have  no
measures of institutions to answer these questions definitely".
It is  nevertheless  possible  to  take  into  consideration  a set  of indicators  and  classify
countries on the basis of existing knowledge  of the policy relevance of these indicators.  This
is the approach followed by Lazear (1990), Nickell (1997), Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and
the  OECD  in  its  Jobs  Study and  Employment  Outlook  (1994,  1999).  We  have  adopted  a
similar approach  in this paper and discuss different sets of indicators of labor market policies
and institutions. This set includes (i) an employment protection legislation  index; (ii) various
measures of the coverage,  cost, and effectiveness  of passive and active labor market policies;
and (iii) indicators of union strength and tax burden on labor (e.g. payroll taxes)'.
' Due mainly  to lack  of accurate  data  we do not examine  in detail the role of minimum  wages.  However,  the
available evidence seems to suggest they are not binding in most of the countries  studied here.
3Using these indicators, we find that:
*  CEE countries do not constitute a monolithic  group. Despite their common recent history
and  similar steps taken to join the EU, they have  adop-a.J  somewhat  different  labor policies.
In  terms  of  employment  protection,  Hungary  seems  to  have  adopted  the  most  flexible
legislation  and Slovenia the least flexible.
*  Despite  some  disparity,  these  countries  - when  compared  to EU  and  OECD  members,
tend to be in the middle of the 'labor market flexibility'  scale (with the exception of Slovenia).
Their labor markets are definitely  less flexible than  those  in the United  States or the United
Kingdom, but certainly not as rigid as those in Southern Europe.
*  Although  CEE countries  have adopted  - again  with some  degree of variation - the set of
policies  (passive  and  active)  common  to  all  EU  and  OECD  countries,  they  are  devoting
modest amounts of budgetary resources  to the unemployed  and, in this respect,  are closer to
the United  States,  the  United Kingdom  and  Southern  Europe  than to Central  and Northern
Europe.
*  Finally these countries have moved away from a centralized wage bargaining  system and
towards  a  more  liberalized  system  of wage  negotiation.  However,  institutions  and  social
norms  inherited  from  the  previous  regime  still  play  an  important  role  in  the  bargaining
process.  Also the tax burden on labor in these countries is the highest in Europe.
We comment on both the differences  and the commonalities  with respect to each type
of indicators below.
A.  Employment Protection  Legislation.
Employment  protection  legislation  refers  to regulations  that  restrict  the  employers'
freedom to dismiss workers.  While their objective is to "protect" the welfare  of employees  by
reducing  their  exposure  to  unfair  actions  and  to  the  risk  of  fluctuating  incomes,  these
regulations  may increase  the costs of employing workers.  The consequence  can be a reduced
flow of vacancies and thus, lower employment levels.
We construct two different Employment  Protection Legislation indices  (EPL, versions
1 and  2)  for  the  six  CEE  countries  using  the  OECD  methodology.  Version  1 considers
exclusively  legislation on permanent  and  temporary  employment,  while Version 2 expands
the scope of the index to account for legislation on collective  dismissals.  Both indices  aim at
4measuring  the degree  of strictness of the legislation.  The  use of the OECD  methodology  in
both cases  allows us to make  comparisons not only among CEE countries, but also with EU
members and other OECD countries.
Although we construct  both indices below,  we will only discuss the expanded  version
(Version 2)2.  This version of the EPL is a weighted  average  of 22  indicators,  some  readily
available  in  quantitative  form  (e.g.  notice  period  or  severance  payment),  some  constructed
from  qualitative  information  (e.g.  difficulty  of dismissal)3. The  indicators  for  the  Czech
Republic, Poland and Hungary are based on OECD data, and the indicators for the remaining,
non-OECD  countries  are based on the review of their most recent labor legislation.  The EPL
index takes  values  I to 6,  and the higher the  value the  stricter is the employment  protection
legislation.
Clearly, countries  in Central and Eastern  Europe do not constitute a monolithic  group.
When  we  compare  the  value  of the  EPL  index  for  all  six  countries,  we  find  substantial
disparities (Table  1). Hungary has the most flexible labor legislation, with an EPL index
Table 1. Employment Protection Legislation  in EU Accession  Countries. Late 1990s.
Regular  Temporary  Collective  EPL Strictness
Empl.  Empl.  Dismissals
Version 21
Index  Rank2
Czech  Republic  2.8  0.5  4.3  2.1  3.0
Estonia  3.1  1.4  4.1  2.6  5.0
Hungary  2.1  0.6  3.4  1.7  1.0
Poland  2.2  1.0  3.9  2.0  2.0
Slovakia  2.6  1.4  4.4  2.4  4.0
Slovenia  3.4  2.4  4.8  3.5  6.0
Slovenia 3 (2.9)  (0.6)  (4.9)  (2.3)  (4.0)
CEEC average  2.7  1.2  4.1  2.4
EU average4 2.4  2.1  3.2  2.4
OECD average5 2.0  1.7  2.9  2.0
Source: OECD (1999) Employment Outlook 1999.  World Bank estimates for Estonia and Slovenia.
1/ Weighted average of indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts, and collective  dismissals.
2/ All rankings increase  with the strictness of employment protection.
3/ Based on proposed labor code.
4/ Does not include Greece and Luxemburg.
5!  Average for all OECD countries on Table Al. 1.
2Version  1 can be found on Tables Al. I and AI.2, in Annex I.
3 See Annex II for a detailed methodological description of  the EPL index.
5value  of 1.7,  closely followed  by  Poland (2.0)  and  the Czech Republic  (2.1).  Slovakia  and
Estonia occupy the middle ground, with an index of 2.4 and 2.6 respectively. Finally, Slovenia
has the most restrictive labor regulations, with an EPL index value of 3.54.
These  disparities  can,  in turn,  be  explained  by  differences  in regular  employment
legislation,  temporary  employment  legislation  and  collective  dismissals  legislation,  with
differences  in temporary employment legislation  being the largest (i.e. the standard deviation
of this indicator represents  50 percent of its mean value, compared to 15 percent  for the other
two indicators).
Regular employment  legislation establishes the rules  for hiring  and firing  procedures
for permanent workers, notification requirements,  and severance payments.  This legislation is
most  flexible  in  Hungary  and  Poland,  with  index  values  of 2.1  and  2.2  respectively.  In
Hungary a written statement to an employee is sufficient for the dismissal to take place, while
in  other  countries  the  notice  of dismissal  must  be  shared  with  a  third  party,  usually  an
employee  representative  body.  In  addition,  in  Hungary  and  Poland  'unsatisfactory
performance'  and 'job redundancy'  are sufficient reasons for dismissal, whereas in the Czech
Republic,  Estonia,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia employers are required to take into account  social
considerations,  to  look  for  retraining  or  even  to  ensure  the  worker's  transfer  to  another
suitable  position.  Finally,  in  both  Hungary  and  Poland  the  notice  period  is  short  and  the
severance payment small5.
Temporarv  employment  legislation  regulates  the  use  of fixed-term  contracts,  their
renewal  and maximum duration, as well as the functioning of temporary work agencies.  The
Czech and Hungarian  legislations stipulate  the  least amount of restrictions  (index  values of
0.5 and 0.6 respectively), while the Estonian,  Polish, and Slovak legislations  are stricter, with
index  values that are two to three  times higher.  Slovenia is an outlier in the group with the
most restrictive legislation of all and an index value of 2.4.
These differences  respond mainly to the fact that in the Czech Republic  and Hungary
temporary  contracts  can  be  used  with  almost  no  restrictions  or limits  to  their number  or
duration, while in other countries they can only be used for specific reasons and for a limited
4  Slovenia is about to  adopt a new, much  more flexible  labor code.  We have  included in all tables EPL values
corresponding  to this  new legislation for the reader to appreciate  the magnitude of the potential  changes,  which
will bring the EPL index to 2.3.
6period. In contrast, differences  in the regulation of temporary work agencies  are nil, with the
6 exception of Slovenia where their use is limited to 2 months
Collective  dismissals  legislation  defines  the  term  'collective',  as  opposed  to
'individual',  and  stipulates  notification  requirements  and  payments  associated  with  such
dismissals.  As was the case with regular and temporary  employment,  Hungary  and Slovenia
have the  least  and most restrictive  legislation,  with index values of 3.4 and 4.8  respectively,
while  the  remaining  countries  fall  in  the  middle.  Although  the  definition  of  'collective
dismissal'7 and most notification requirements are very similar in all these countries, there are
some differences regarding the additional  delays and costs imposed  on employers in the case
of collective  dismissals vs. individual  dismissals. For example, in Poland an additional month
delay  is required  for  the  notification  to  take  place,  while  in  the  Czech  Republic  the  delay
amounts  to almost four months.  Similarly,  in Hungary  and the Czech Republic there  are no
additional  costs associated  with collective  dismissals,  whereas in the other four  countries the
employer has to disburse  additional severance  pay or provide  additional  compensation,  such
as retraining or re-employment.
Differences  in  employment  protection  legislation  not  only  exists  among  CEE
countries, but also, and to an even greater extent, among the members of the European Union
and other OECD members.  As already shown by the OECD  study (1994,  1999) as well as by
Nickell  (1997)  the EPL index  ranges from 0.7 to 3.7 among  OECD  countries (Figure  1 and
Table AI.l) 8. This  large  diversity  is fully reflected  within  the EU which includes  countries
such as the United Kingdom, Ireland,  and Denmark which do not have a strict legislation and,
at the  other  side  of the spectrum,  countries  in  Southern  Europe  (Italy,  Spain and  Portugal)
which  have by far the most protective  legislation (with an EPL index equal to  or larger than
3.1). Germany, France, and some Scandinavian countries occupy the middle of the range.
5 The thorough reader may consult Table AII.3, Annex II, for details.
6 Idem. Table AII.4, Annex II.
7 Dismissal of more than  10 employees.
s All tables containing data for OECD and EU countries can be found in Annex  I.
7Figure 1. Employment Protection Legislation Index in Selected  OECD
and EU Accession  Countries.
Employment Protection Legislation  Index
Range: 1 (low)  to 6 (high)
is
0.5- 
What  constitutes  no  surprise  is  the  comparison  with  the  United  States.  That
comparison  does support  the frequent  assertion that European  labor markets  are much  less
flexible  than  the  United  States  labor  market.  The  United  States  index  is  the lowest  of all.
However, it is closely followed  by the Anglo-Saxon  countries which are part of the European
Union, United Kingdom and Ireland.
The comparison between the two sets of countries  shows that CEE countries tend to be
in the middle  of  a "labor market flexibility"  scale.  Slovenia is the exception  and falls at the
end of the range  (until the new legislation under preparation  is approved).  Labor  markets in
CEE are definitely less flexible than in the United States,  the United Kingdom or Canada, but
certainly not  as rigid as in some  countries of Southern  Europe.  Out of a total of 26 countries
classified by order of increasing EPL index:  (i) Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic hold
positions 9,  10 and  11  respectively,  (ii) Slovakia and Estonia hold rank  16 and 18 respectively
and (iii) Slovenia is number 25.  If Slovenia  adopts its new labor code,  it would climb up the
ladder to rank 16 (Table AI.2).
These cross-country differences  in the overall ranking,  although not large, are enough
to  suggest  that,  when  adopting  new  labor  legislation  during the  transition  period,  the  CEE
countries  may have  been influenced  more by  geographical  or cultural  proximity than by the
8desire to imitate a single European model. For instance, Estonia is close to Norway or Sweden
in terms of the EPL index, while Slovenia seems closer to Italy or Germany.
B.  Passive  and  Active Labor  Market Policies.
We analyze  here  the  different  policies  adopted  by the  CEE  countries to  support the
unemployed.  We  distinguish  between  passive  (i.e.  unemployment  insurance  system)  and
active policies (i.e. job assistance, training, public works, wage subsidies,  etc). While passive
labor market policies may create incentives to remain unemployed  for a longer period of time,
active  policies  aim  at  facilitating  the  re-entry  into  the  labor  market.  The  final  impact  on
unemployment  will depend  on the  features  of the various  programs,  notably  their  relative
generosity and importance in budgetary terms.
We  again  find  that  diversity  prevails  . Although  CEE  countries  have  adopted  a
package of measures similar to those of other European  countries, they differ significantly in
terms of benefits,  coverage and duration of their programs,  as well as in terms of their relative
preference  for passive or active policies.
(i)  Passive Labor Market Policies: Unemployment Insurance  (MI)
The  generosity  (or  lack  thereof)  of  a  particular  unemployment  insurance  system
depends on the quantity and duration of the benefits,  and the system's eligibility rules. Hence,
we concentrate on these features.
A simple  way  to compare  'benefit  quantity'  across  the CEE  countries  is to look  at
benefit replacement  ratios - i.e.  initial level of benefits  divided by some average  measure of
previous  earned  income.  Replacement  ratios  in  the  CEE  countries  range  from  40  to  64
percent,  except  in  the  case  of Estonia  where  this  number  is  10  percent9 (Table  2).  An
alternative way to perform this comparison  is to express benefits as a fraction of the minimum
and average  wages in each  country.  Then unemployment  benefits  represent between 60 and
100 percent of the minimum wage, and between  10 and 45 percent of the average wage (Table
3).  Although they are within  the EU  and OECD ballpark  (35  to 75  percent),  these numbers
reveal important differences across countries.
9 Unemployment  benefits  are  a function  of the  minimum  wage,  rather than of previous  earned  income.  As a
result the level  of protection,  measured  by the replacement  ratio,  is very  low,  especially  for those  with high
salaries.
9Table 2. Features of the Unemployment  Insurance System  in EU Accession  Countries (I).
Late 1990s.
Benefit RR  Benefit Duration
(%)  (months)
Czech Republic  50  6
Estonia  lo,  3-6
Hungary  64  124
Poland  405  12_246
Slovakia  60  6-12'
Slovenia  63  3-24'
CEE average  48 (55)8
EU average9 60
OECD averagel'  58
Source: OECD  Employment  Outlook (1995,  1999),  IMF  World Economic  Outlook (1999),  IMF Article  IV - Consultation
with the  Slovak  Republic,  World  Bank estimates  for  Estonia  and  Slovakia,  Czech  Republic: Towards EU Accession (The
World Bank,  1999), Slovak Republic: A Strategyfor Growth and Economic Integration  (The World Bank, 1998).
1/  Description  of categories:  (i) Benefit RR - Benefit  Replacement  Ratio - initial  benefit  level  divided  by previous  earned
income, (ii)  Benefit Duration - Benefit Duration - maximum  duration,  in months, depending on various criteria (age,  family
status,  employment record/  contributive history).
2' Data for Czech Republic,  Estonia and  Slovenia  are from  1998; data for Hungary  are from  1997, and data for  Poland and
Slovakia are  from 1996.
31  Benefits are set at 60% of minimum wage. This amounts to approximately  10% of the average wage.
4,' Requires 4 years of employment.
51 The replacement ratio is 40% of the average  wage for the year prior to unemployment.
6/ Benefit duration  increases with previous employment tenure.
7.' Benefit duration  is  a function of the worker's contributive  history.
8,' Figure in parentheses  does not include Estonia
9.' Does not include Greece  and Luxemburg.
10/ Average  for all OECD countries on Table Al.3.
Benefit duration also varies from country to country. For instance, maximum duration
in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Estonia  is  6  months,  compared  to  12  months  in  Hungary  and
Slovakia,  or even  24  months in Poland  and Slovenia  (Table 2).  These  figures are  similar to
those in the EU  and OECD  countries  (e.g.  6 months  in the United States,  12  months in the
United Kingdom, 24 months in Spain, no limit in Belgium).
10Table 3. Features of the Unemployment  Insurance System in EU Accession  Countries (II).
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Czech  Coverage  rate  46.5  50.5  47.1  44.2  50.1  51.4  49.2
Republic
% minimum  63.8  75.2  83.3  93.5  92.2  102.7  88.1
wage
% average wage  30.2  28.4  26.6  25.2  23.8  24.0  20.0
Estonia  Coverage rate  56.4  46.3  39.9  45.4  53.6  55.1
% minimum  60.0  60.0  40.0  35.3  28.4  27.3
wage
% average wage  16.9  10.4  7.6  8.0  6.7  7.2
Hungary  Coverage rate'  76.8  78.1  74.1  76.7  79.0  73.5  71.3  73.6
% minimum  75.0  75.0  75.0  75.0  75.0
wage
% average wage  28.1  26.9  24.6  23.4  23.3
Poland  Coverage rate  79.0  52.3  48.3  50.1  58.9  51.9  30.5  22.9
%minimum  100-  100-  95.3  98.0  81.0  110
wage  305  310
% average wage  up to  up to  36.0  36.0  36.0  45.0
100  100
Slovakia  Coverage rate  82.0  34.0  34.0  23.0  23.0  28.0  27.0  28.0
% minimum  61.7  72.2  70.6  106.9  109.3
wage
% average wage  24.0  24.6  23.4  31.3  32.8
Slovenia  Coverage rate  40.0  45.0  43.1  42.1  30.3  30.3  32.6  32.6
% minimum  100-  100-  100-  100-  100-  100-  100-  187.2
wage2  300  300  300  300  300  300  300
% average wage  32.7  44.1  47.1  43.3  43.4  43.1  43.9
Source:  Employment  and  Labor  Market  country  reports  prepared  by  the  European  Training  Foundation  (1999),  EBRD
Transition Report (1999),  Central Bank of Estonia, and OECD Employment Outlook (1999).
1/ Data include  (i) unemployment benefits,  and (ii) income support once unemployment  benefits  are exhausted.
2/ Data  from the annual  reports  of the  Slovene  National  Employment  Office,  the  Bank of Slovenia  Monthly  Bulletin,  and
Labor Market  Issues in Slovenia (The World Bank, 1998).
Instead of directly comparing  eligibility  rules across countries,  which would be rather
cumbersome,  we use  the coverage  rate as a proxy indicator  - i.e.  percentage  of unemployed
receiving  unemployment  insurance  benefits  (Table  3).  Coverage  rates  in the Czech Republic
and Estonia are around 40-50 percent, having remained  fairly stable over the last decade. This
has also been the case in Hungary, although coverage is much higher there (70-75 percent). In
contrast,  the remaining  three countries  have  seen coverage rates  fall continuously  throughout
the  1990s,  from  80  to  20 percent  in  Poland  and  Slovakia,  and  from  40  to  30  percent  in
Slovenia.Not  surprisingly,  such differences  in  benefit  quantity and duration,  and  in coverage
rates  translate  into  differences  spending  in  unemployment  insurance.  The  CEE  countries
spend less than  1 percent of GDP on unemployment insurance,  with the exception of Poland
where  this  figure  is  1.7  percent  (Table  4).  Nevertheless,  even  at this  low  level,  there  is
significant  variation  across  countries,  with  Slovenia  spending  0.9  percent  and  Estonia
spending less than 0.1 percent.
Table 4. Spending  on Passive and Active Labor Market Policies  in EU Accession
Countries'.
Unemployment  Passive policies  Active  policies
Rate  % GDP  Spending  % GDP  Spending
per  per
unemployed  unemployed
Czech  Republic (1999)  8.8  0.31  0.04  0.19  0.02
Estonia (1998)  9.9  0.08  0.01  0.08  0.01
Hungary (1997)  8.7  0.56  0.06  0.40  0.04
Poland (1996)  14.3  1.71  0.12  0.49  0.03
Slovakia (1996)  11.1  0.54  0.05  0.56  0.05
Slovenia (1998)  7.9  0.89  0.11  0.83  0.11
CEEC average  0.68  0.06  0.42  0.04
EU average3 1.73  0.26  1.16  0.16
OECD average4 1.43  0.23  0.92  0.14
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1997, 1999), CEM Slovak Republic,  ELFS (1998), RZS (1999).
1  / Data from different years - 1997, 1998 and  1999 (in parentheses)
2/  Spending per unemployed: Ratio of GDP spending on Ul to unemployment rate (both in percentage terms.
3/ Does not include Luxemburg.
4/ Average  for all OECD countries  on Table AI.4.
These aggregate  spending  figures,  however,  can be misleading since they are partly a
function of the number of unemployedl'.  To correct this caveat, we consider the ratio of GDP
spending  to the  unemployment  rate (both  in percentage  terms) as an  alternative  measure  of
expenditure.  We  then find that these countries have been spending  a relatively small amount
of  resources  to  support  the  unemployed  (between  0.01  and  0.12  percent  of  GDP  per
percentage point of unemployment).
10  For example,  assume  country  A  and  country  B  have  the  same  unemployment  insurance  system,  but  the
unemployment rate  in  country A is double that in country B. Then  spending will appear  to be higher in country
B, even though both systems are equally generous.
12These  numbers  are  generally  lower  than  those  of EU  and  OECD  members,  which
devote  more than 1 percent of GDP (0.25  percent of GDP per percentage  point of insurance
unemployment)  to unemployment insurance  (Table AI.4). In this regard, unemployment
Box  1. Support to the Unemployed  in Selected  OECD and EU Accession  Countries.
The ratio of  GDP spending to the unemployment rate can be also interpreted as the amount out of each dollar produced by a labor
force  member  that  is  spent on  the  unemployed.  For instance,  if the  Czech  Republic  spends  in  Ul  0.04  percent  of GDP  per
percentage point of unemployment,  we can also say that out of each dollar produced  by a labor force member 4 cents are given to
the unemployed in the form of Ul.
When  we think in these terms, we can see that on average the CEE countries spend 6 cents on passive  labor policies out of every
dollar produced  by a  labor force  member,  and an  additional  4  cents in  active labor  market policies.  In contrast,  EU (OECD)
countries  spend  26  (23)  cents in passive  polices  and  16  (14)  cents in  active  policies  out of every  dollar.  This is  more than  a
sevenfold difference (Table Bl .1).
However,  substantial  differences  exist among  OECD members.  The Netherlands,  Denmark and  Austria are among the countries
that  spend  the  most per  unemployed  worker,  with  85  (55),  60  (34)  and  32  (14)  cents  spent  on  passive  (active)  policies
respectively.  When compare to this group, the CEE countries  seem to be spending  even relatively  smaller amounts in support of
the unemployed.
Table B1.1 Spending  on Passive  and Active  Labor Market Policies'.
_-Passive  policies  Active policies  Total





EU average 3 1.73  0.26  1.16  0.16  2.89  0.42
OECD average4 1.43  0.23  0.92  0.14  2.35  0.37
OECD - high
spending
Netherlands  2.81  0.85  1.80  0.55  4.61  1.40
Denmark  3.12  0.60  1.77  0.34  4.89  0.94
Austria  1.22  0.32  0.52  0.14  1.74  0.46
OECD - low  spending
United States  0.25  0.06  0.18  0.04  0.43  0.10
Japan  0.52  0.13  0.09  0.02  0.61  0.15
UK  0.82  0.12  0.37  0.05  1.19  0.17
Spain  1.41  0.09  0.81  0.05  2.22  0.14
CEEC average  0.68  0.06  0.18  0.04  0.86  0.10
Czech  Republic  0.31  0.04  0.19  0.02  0.50  0.06
Estonia  0.08  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.16  0.02
Hungary  0.56  0.06  0.40  0.04  0.96  0.10
Poland  1.71  0.12  0.49  0.03  2.20  0.15
Slovakia  0.54  0.05  0.56  0.05  1.10  0.10
Slovenia  0.89  0.11  0.83  0.11  1.72  0.22
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook (1997,  1999), CEM Slovak Republic, ELFS (1998), RZS (1999).
I/ Data from different years  - 1996,  1997 and 1999  (see Table 4).
2/ Spending per unemployed: Ratio of GDP spending on Ul to unemployment rate (both in percentage terms).
3/ No data for Luxemburg.
4/ Average for all OECD  countries on Table AI.4.
In contrast, countries like the United States,  Japan and Spain spend much smaller amounts both on passive and active policies. All
three devote between  6 and 13  cents out of every dollar to  UI, and between  2 and  5 cents to active policies.  These numbers are
significantly  closer  to  those  of the  CEE  countries.  Hence,  even  though  on  average  the  CEE  countries  spend  less  on  the
unemployed than OECD and EU members, their policies are fairly similar to those of some OECD/EU countries.
'Data  for a larger selection of OECD countries can be found on Table AI.4.
13policies in CEE countries  are closer to those of the United  States, the United  Kingdom and
Southern Europe, than to those of countries in Central and Northern Europe (see Box 1).
(ii)  Active Labor Market Policies
Active  labor  market  policies  cover  a vast  array  of programs,  including  job  search
assistance  and counseling,  training for unemployed  and youth,  employment  subsidies,  direct
job creation  and  special  measures  for  disadvantaged  groups.  Given  the  extensiveness  and
varied  nature of all  these  different  programs,  we feel  that  a detailed  discussion  and  cross-
country comparison of their features and roles is beyond the scope of this paper.  We therefore
limit our analysis to spending in active labor market policies.
The EU accession countries  spend between 0.08 and 0.83 of their GDP in active labor
market policies  (Table  4). Even  though these  are  not  large  amounts,  they reveal  important
differences across countries - i.e. Slovenia spends a share of her GDP that is ten times higher
than  that  spent  by  Estonia.  When  we  adjust  this  measure  to  account  for  differences  in
unemployment  rates,  these  countries  spend  between  0.01  and  0.11  percent  of  GDP  per
percentage point of unemployment.
Although,  compared  to  the  EU  and  the  OECD,  spending  in  active  labor  market
policies in these six countries  is fairly low on average,  substantial  variation exists among the
former.  For example,  the  United  States  and  Japan  spend  less than  0.2 percent  of GDP  on
active policies,  while the Netherlands  spend  0.8  percent  (Table  AI.4).  This  suggests that,  in
general,  the  CEE  countries  have  followed  closely  the  practices  of the  first  group,  hence
devoting modest amount of resources to these programs (see Box 1).
(iii)  Relative Weight of Active and Passive Labor Market Policies
When  choosing  between  active  and  passive  policies,  the  experience  of the  CEE
countries  is mixed.  Estonia,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia  spend  almost the same  on both types of
programs, measured  as share of GDP per percentage point of unemployment,  while the other
three countries favor passive policies over active ones.
In doing this, they are closer to the average  OECD member.  In fact most countries in
the  EU and the  OECD devote more  resources  to their passive  labor market policies  than to
their active ones, the exceptions being Italy, Norway and Sweden.
14C.  Strength of Unions and Tax Burden on Labor.
We discuss here two of the main factors that influence wage  formation and determine
labor costs; namely the role of unions in the collective bargaining process and the tax burden
on  labor.  We  choose  to  concentrate  on  these  two  measures  for  the  sake  of comparability
between our results for the CEE countries and Nickell's results for the OECD countries.
In most European countries,  with the exception of the United Kingdom, trade  unions
play  a  significant  role  in  wage  determination  and,  even  when  the  number  of unionized
workers is fairly low, agreements reached under collective bargaining can extend to non-union
members,  thus  covering  a  large  fraction  of the  labor  force.  Furthermore,  the  impact  that
collective bargaining can have on wages is likely to depend on the degree of coordination that
exists between different unions and employer  associations,  as well  as on the extent to which
the government is involved in the negotiation process.
Similarly, payroll and other taxes can increase the cost of labor, even in the absence of
upward  pressure  on wages.  Although,  in  theory,  part of the  tax burden  can  be passed  onto
workers through  lower wages, it is not unreasonable  to expect that high taxes on labor may
have a negative effect on hiring and firing decisions.
We  find that, compared to countries  in the EU and the OECD, the CEE countries  fall
in the middle  of the range  in terms  of union strength  and  coordination  regarding  collective
bargaining.  In contrast, they have very high payroll and other taxes, well above those in Spain,
Italy or the Netherlands - which set the upper limit in the EU.
(i)  Wage Bargaining:  The Role of Unions and Emploeer Associations" I
The CEE countries  offer a fairly homogenous  picture regarding wage bargaining  and
the  role  of unions/employer  associations.  During  the  last  decade,  these  countries  have  all
started  to  move  away  from  a  centralized  wage  bargaining  system,  and  towards  a  more
liberalized  regime of wage  negotiation,  and these  changes  have been  especially  relevant for
newly created firms. As a result, although union density and coverage are  still high, there are
important differences  between the public and the private sectors, with unions holding a much
weaker position in the latter.
11 Annex III contains a detailed discussion  on these issues for each one of the EU accession countries considered
in this paper.
15We present data on union membership and de facto union coverage,  as well as on the
degree of coordination among unions and employer associations.  Membership is measured as
the  percentage  of all  salaried  workers  who  belong  to  a union,  while  coverage  is  captured
through a coverage  index that takes a value of 1 when collective agreements  cover  less than
25 percent of all salaried  workers, 2 if this number is between 26 and 69 percent,  :tid 3 when
coverage  is  above  70  percent.  Finally,  the  degree  of union  and  employer  coordination  is
measured through an index that ranks from 1 (low) to 3 (high).
Union density ranges  from  a low 34  percent  of all  salaried  workers  in Poland,  to  a
reasonably high 62 percent in Slovakia. Union coverage, however, is large (above 70 percent)
in most countries, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Estonia (Table 5).
Table 5. The Role of Unions and Payroll Taxes in EU Accession  Countries.
1'  2  3  ---  4  5
Union density  Union  Coordination  Payroll tax  Total tax
(%)2  coverage  Union  Employer  rate  rate (%)
index3 (%)
Czech  Republic  42.8  2  1  1  47.5  73.4
Estonia  36.1  2  2  1  33.0  63.3
Hungary  60.0  3  1  2  44.0  81.5
Poland  33.8  3  2  1  48.2  80.0
Slovakia  61.7  3  2  2  50.0  81.0
Slovenia  60.0  3  3  3  38.0  69.1
CEEC average  49.1  43.4  74.7
EU average
4 44.4  23.5  53.0
OECD average
5 39.6  19.5  45.4
Source:  Columns  I  (except  Slovenia) and  2  (except  Czech  Republic  and  Hungary)  from  ILO (1997)  World Labor  Report
1997-98  and  OECD  Employment  Outlook (1997);  data for  Slovenia,  the  Czech  Republic  and  Hungary  estimated  by  the
World Bank. Columns 3, 4 and 5 from  (i) Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu  International  -Taxation  in Eastern Europe (1997), (ii)
Bank of Estonia, (iii) Polish Agency for Foreign Investment, (iv) EIU (1998), and (v) Labour Regulations in Eastern  Europe,
Business Eastern Europe.
1/ All data for 1995, except for Denmark, Ireland,  Italy, Spain and Sweden (1993),  and estimated  data for Slovenia.
2/  Percentage of salaried workers that belong  to a union.
3/  1:  less than 25% of salaried workers are covered  by collective agreements,  2: between 26 and 69% are covered, 3: 70% or
more are covered.
4/ No data for Greece and Luxemburg.
5/ Average for all OECD countries in Table AI.5.
However,  this  does  not  translate  into  high  union  bargaining  power  due  to  low
coordination  among  unions  (Table  5).  In  fact,  although  sometimes  basic  guidelines  are
established  through tripartite negotiations  with the government,  most wage  bargaining  takes
16place  at the industry  or the firm level  and, in practice,  in the private sector wages  are set by
employers.
In contrast, EU and OECD members present a more varied picture. Both union density
and union coverage  differ substantially across  countries,  with the United  States and Sweden
representing  the  two  extremes  (Table  AI.5).  In  addition,  coordination  levels  have  changed
substantially  over recent  years,  with no  identifiable  unique  trend.  For example,  unions  and
employer associations  in Scandinavian  countries  and Central  Europe tend to coordinate  their
wage bargaining  activities, while very little coordination  exists in the United Kingdom  or the
United States (OECD,  1997; Nickell  1997).  This places  the CEE countries  somewhere in the
middle of the range, together with countries like Belgium or the Netherlands.
(ii)  Payroll taxes
Payroll  taxes  in  Eastern  European  countries  are  high,  even  for  Western  European
standards.  Rates  range  from  33  percent  in  Estonia  to  50  percent  in  Slovakia,  while  only
France,  Italy,  Spain and  Sweden  have rates above  30 percent,  and in no case  higher than 40
percent (Table 5 and Figure 2).
Figure 2. Tax Burden on Labor in Selected  OECD and EU Accession  Countries.
Tax Burden on Labor -Payroll tax rate  (e/e)
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During the transition period the fiscal pressure to maintain high payroll taxes, or even
to  increase  them,  was  extremely  strong.  Unemployment  was  on  the  rise  and this  forced
governments  to  continuously  increase  spending  on  unemployment  insurance  systems  and
active  labor  market  policies.  An aging  population  and  declining  employment  rates  also  put
additional strain on the public pension system, through falling revenues and increased outlays.
Finally,  a decrease  in other types of tax proceeds  due to the economic contraction  obliged to
look for alternative sources  of revenues  to cover public expenditures,  in particular for health
and social assistance.
Despite  these  problems,  some countries  have recently  started  to  lower their  payroll
taxes (e.g. Hungary),  albeit at a very slow and gradual pace, and there is reason to believe that
other will follow as the economic  situation improves, bringing unemployment  down.
Moreover, the tax burden on labor exceeds the amount of the payroll tax. Consumption
and income taxes also affect labor income and are part of the tax wedge between  labor costs
and  take-home  pay.  When  both consumption and income  taxes are considered,  the total  tax
burden on labor varies greatly between countries and Eastern Europe continues to exhibit the
12 highest total tax rates (Table 5 and Figure 2)
12 See also Table Al.5 for EU and OECD data.
18Thus, according to the evidence presented  in this section,  we can say that, by the end
of the  1990s,  the EU accession  countries  had adopted  labor  market  institutions  that  indeed
resembled those  in EU  countries.  However, in doing so they followed up to neither the most
nor the  least flexible 'role models',  but opted instead for a fairly moderate set of institutions,
hence placing themselves in the middle range of the flexibility scale.  It is only with respect to
payroll taxes that CEE countries stand at the extreme of the range.
III.  Output and Labor Market Dynamics  in the Transition.
Before trying to assess the role played by labor market institutions in shaping the labor
markets  of CEE  countries,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  economic  and  social  context  in
which these institutions were introduced or modified.
The past decade  has  been  a time of dramatic  transformation  in  Central  and Eastern
Europe.  The  fall  of the  Soviet Block  and the transition  from command  to market  economy
produced  remarkable  changes  in  the  social,  political  and economic  infrastructures  of CEE
countries.  From an economic point of view, these changes were most important in real output
(as  measured  by  GDP)  and factor  markets,  particularly  in labor  allocations,  as  the rules  of
economic  interactions  between  members of the ex-soviet  block, and  between  them  and  the
rest of the world changed dramatically with the introduction of market-based practices.  While
in  the  command-economy  system  the risk  of open  unemployment  and  dislocation  due  to
economic  fluctuations  was  virtually nil, efficiency  in the allocation  of resources  was poor.
The rewards that market systems assign to  different  degrees  of human capital  or to  specific
skills were practically undifferentiated,  and labor and capital productivity was low.  Wages in
the  command  production  system  were  centrally  determined  and  highly  compressed.  Labor
mobility was for all practical purposes non-existent.  In a nutshell, job security was the prize,
but this  came  at the  expense  of efficiency  and  distorted  market incentives,  that  eventually
generated fatigue in the socialist production model.
A.  Output
As the old socialist economic model was breaking apart, real output collapsed in every
country of the soviet-block,  albeit with different intensities  (Figure 3).  In response, the new
leaders  of the  CEE  economies  formulated  reform  strategies  focusing  on macroeconomic
stabilization  and  structural  reforms  at  the  micro  level.  Modern  market  structures  were
19gradually introduced.  Labor markets adjusted to the new economic  environment by reducing
employment and labor force participation, especially of women, which was unusually high in
CEE, and by increasing open unemployment to rates unseen in this part of the world.
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In  addition to  changes  in the  level of GDP,  the  restructuring  process  involved  a significant
shift in economic activity across sectors.  By 1998 the contribution of agriculture to total GDP
had fallen in all countries to at least half its 1989  level (Table 6).  A decline also occurred in
the  industrial  sector  over the  decade,  with  its  share of GDP  falling  between  7  percentage
points for Slovenia (from 45.6 to 38.6 percent)  and 27 percentage  points for Slovakia  (from
58.5  to  31.6  percent).  As  a result  of these  changes,  the service  sector  share of GDP grew
significantly.
Table 6. Output per sector in EU Accession  Countries (%  of GDP).
Agriculture  Industry  Services  Private sector
1989  1998  1989  1998  1989  1998  1990  2000
Czech Republic  8.5  4.2  57.7  39.2  33.8  56.6  5.0  80.0
Estonia  21.0  6.3  40.6  26.7  38.4  67.0  10.0  75.0
Hungary  15.6  5.5  46.7  28.2  40.7  66.3  20.0  80.0
Poland  12.9  4.9  52.4  32.0  34.7  62.4  25.0  70.0
Slovakia  9.4  4.4  58.5  31.6  32.2  64.0  5.0  75.0
Slovenia  5.5  4.0  46.6  38.6  48.9  57.4  10.0  55.0
Source: The World Bank (2000) and EBRD Transition Report (2000).
1/ Data for 1997 instead of 1998.
2/ Data for 1991  instead of 1990.
Even  more drastic  that these  sectoral  shifts, though,  was  the transformation  of these
economies  from  public  sector  to  private  sector  dominated  economies.  The  share  of GDP
produced by the private sector went from a low 5 percent in the old Czechoslovakia  in 1990 to
20as much as 80 percent in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2000.  Only in Slovenia was this
transformation less intense and the private sector, while dominant, is smaller than elsewhere.
B.  Employment, Unemployment, Labor Force Participation  and Wages.
The  transition  had  significant  repercussions  on  labor market  outcomes,  in terms  of
both levels and composition.  The level of employment  responded to the initial output decline
(Figure 4). As a result, aggregate employment fell substantially at the beginning of the 1990s
Figure 4. GDP and Aggregate  Employment Levels in EU Accession  Countries.
Czech Republic,  1990-20t0  EAtDoA,  1990-2000
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21and continued to decline in most countries,  although at a slower pace, throughout the decade.
However, while output started to grow in the mid nineties and has in some cases surpassed the
pre-transition levels (Poland, Slovenia)  employment levels have not recovered.
The  flip  side  of such  employment  performance  was, not  surprisingly,  a  substantial
increase in unemployment.  With the exception of the Czech Republic,  all countries  saw their
unemployment rates move rapidly to double-digit figures during the early 1  990s (Figure 5).
Although  some of them have been able to bring those numbers  down in recent years,
high unemployment is still one of the most important concerns to policy makers in the region.
Figure 5. Unemployment  in EU Accession  Countries.
Unemployment  rate,  1993-1999  (Survey)
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However,  unemployment  is  not  the  only  margin  of adjustment  when  employment
creation is weak.  In the light of dim employment prospects, jobless workers can decide to exit
the labor  force,  instead  of looking  for a job.  During the transition  labor force participation
rates fell substantially  in these countries (Table  7).  This fall was so large in some cases that it
brought overall participation  rates back to their  1960-64 levels, after continuous increases  in
the  1970s and  1980s.
22Table 7. Labor Force Participation Rates in EU Accession  Countries.
1960-64  1970-74  1980-84  1990-94  1995-99
Czech Republic'  All (15-64)  68.46  73.82  76.08  73.40  72.20
Female (15-64)  49.14  61.62  68.64  69.30  64.00
Estonia  All (15-64)  75.70  81.40  82.00  79.40  78.70
Female (15-64)  67.30  77.60  78.90  75.90  74.90
Hungary  All (15-64)  68.40  72.60  73.30  68.60  69.00
Female (15-64)  46.90  57.20  62.10  59.30  60.30
Poland  All (15-64)  75.40  76.50  75.90  73.40  71.80
Female (15-64)  62.10  67.40  67.70  65.10  65.60
Slovakia2 All (15-64)  66.40  68.90  76.40  70.80  69.00
Female (15-64)  47.30  56.10  69.30  65.10  62.80
Slovenia  All (I5-64)  65.90  65.10  74.40  70.70  70.20
Female (15-64)  44.20  46.20  67.20  64.80  64.80
Source: Martin  Ramna and Raquel Artecona: "A database of Labor Market Indicators across Countries"
Unpublished,  The World Bank.
I/ Data for  1990-99 from OECD. Data for 1960-84 estimated by the authors.
2/ Data for  1990-99 from Lubyova (1999).
In  addition,  changes  in the labor  market,  however,  were not  limited  to the ups  and
downs  of employment,  unemployment  or  labor  force  participation.  The  substitution  of
centralized  commands  by  market  forces  as  the  mode  of labor  allocation  also  altered  the
composition  of these  pools  of workers,  as  certain  worker  characteristics  become  more
valuable  than others in the labor market.  There  was significant labor relocation  away  from
agriculture and industry, and toward services,  as a consequence of sectoral  shifts in economic
activity. This relocation was accompanied by a shift in labor demand towards  a different skill
mix and  higher education  levels, affecting  the level  of 'employability'  of different  types of
workers.
As a result, more and more the unemployed became either younger or older workers,
or workers with low education or skills, giving rise to patterns that closely resembled those of
the unemployed in the EU (see Box 2).
23Box  2.  Similarities in the Demographics  of the Unemployed  in Slovakia and Spain.
The evolution of unemployment  in  the CEE countries  has been  such that the characteristics  of the  unemployed
resemble  substantially  those  of unemployed  workers  in  most  EU  countries.  To  illustrate  this  point  we  study  the
characteristics  of the unemployed  in Slovakia in 1994-2000  and compare them to the characteristics  of the unemployed  in
Spain, also a high unemployment country, in 1997.
Unemployment  rates in Slovakia  vary widely with education and age. Consistently  unemployment  rates have been
negatively correlated with education,  so that workers with a college education  have performed much better than those with
primary or even secondary  studies (Table B2. 1).  In addition, differences  across education groups have widened over time.
While  in 1994  the  unemployment rate  for workers with an  apprenticeship  degree was  15  percent,  compared  to 4 percent
for those  with  a  college  degree,  in  2000 these  rates  were  20  and  5  percent  respectively.  That  is,  while  in  1994  the
unemployment risk of a worker with  an apprentice degree  was three times that of a worker with a college degree,  in 2000
the unemployment risk of the former was five times that of the latter.
Table B2.1  Unemployment  rates by education  levels.  Slovakia.
____  _  __  _  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Less than basic  44.2  39.5  64.3  66.7  88.5  NA  NA
Basic  27.4  26.9  23.7  27.6  25.8  33.60  39.0
Apprenticeship low  14.4  13.1  10.8  11.0  12.7  17.40  20.6
Vocational  low  13.6  12.7  10.0  11.3  10.8  18.95  19.9
Apprenticeship complete  15.3  9.5  8.1  10.6  9.6  15.60  19.6
Vocational  complete  9.8  7.1  7.4  8.2  8.7  13.10  14.0
Grammar  13.1  14.3  11.8  14.6  13.8  17.12  17.7
University (+)  3.8  2.9  3.4  3.2  4.2  5.50  4.8
Source: Slovak Labor Force Survey.
Unemployment  has also been  much higher among  young workers  (15 to 24 years of age)  than among prime-age
ones (Table B2.2).  However, unlike in the previous case, relative differences across the two groups  have been fairly stable
over time, with unemployment  rates increasing by about 40 percent for both groups between  1994 and  2000.  As a result,
the unemployment risk of a young worker has remained at a level that is about twice that of prime age workers.
In contrast,  unemployment has been systematically  lower among older workers than among prime-age  ones.  This,
however,  responds  to differences  in participation  rates between  both  groups rather  than to a relative preference  for  older
workers  among employers.  What is more importantly is that such a difference has become smaller over time, as the risk of
unemployment  ainong older workers has increased by 65 percent compared to 40 percent for prime-age ones.
Table B2.2 Unemployment rate by age groups. Slovakia.
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
15-24  26.5  22.4  19.4  23.5  26.6  33.7  35.9
25-49  11.5  10.4  9.2  9.8  9.5  13.8  15.8
50-64  8.2  7.1  5.7  6.6  6.8  10.2  13.4
Source:  Slovak Labor Force Survey.
Finally, when we compare  the characteristics of the Slovak and the Spanish unemployed  we find them to be fairly
similar -unemployment  rates are high among the least educated and the young (Table B2.3).
Table B2.3  Unemployment  rate by education  and age groups. Spain, 1998.
% unemployed  in  % unemployed  in
group  group
Education groups  Age groups
Less than upper sec.  17.0  (12.6)'  15-24  34.1
Upper Secondary  15.3  ( 10.0)  2549  16.5
College  (+)  13.1  (8.5)  50-64  10.3
Source: Spanish Labor Force Survey.
1/ Data for male unemployment between parentheses.
24Finally,  real wages fell in most countries  as a consequence  of rising inflation levels.
However,  the  decline  was perhaps  less  than  necessary.  Real  wages  needed  to decline  to
facilitate  the reallocation  of labor,  but in some  countries  like Hungary,  Poland,  real wages
(when  measured  with  a  production  price  index)  did  neither  fall  rapidly  nor  did  they  fall
enough to facilitate the reallocation of workers  and even in some countries  like Slovenia real
wages actually grew, rather than decline (Table 8). 13  This reduced job turnover and prevented
a more rapid absorption of the growing unemployment.
Table 8. Real Wages  in EU Accession  Countries: Growth Rate and Level.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Czech Republic  real growth  -26.3  10.2  3.7  7.7  8.7  8.8  1.9  -1.3  4.5
index(1990=100)  100.0  73.7  81.2  84.2  90.7  98.6  107.3  109.3  107.9  112.7
afterinitialdecline  index(1991=100)  100.0  110.2  114.3  123.1  133.8  145.6  148.3  146.4  153.0
Hungary  real growth  -0.2  -3.7  1.7  -0.5  5.1  -8.9  -2.6  3.4  3.5
index(1990=100)  100.0  96.3  97.9  97.4  102.4  93.3  90.9  94.0  97.3
after initialdecline  index(1991=100)  103.8 100.0  101.7  101.2  106.4  96.9  94.4  97.6  101.0
Estonia  real growth  15.0  -59.4  2.3  10.1  6.2  2.1  7.6  6.7  3.7
index (1990=100)  100.0  115.0  46.7  47.8  52.6  55.8  57.0  61.4  65.5  67.9
afterinitialdecline  index(1992=100)  100.0  102.3  112.7  119.6  122.1  131.5  140.3  145.4
Poland  real growth  -24.4  -0.3  -2.7  -2.9  0.5  3.0  5.7  6.8
index(1990=100)  100.0  99.7  97.0  94.2  94.7  97.5  103.1  110.1
decline prior to 1990
Slovakia  real growth  -5.6  -26.3  8.9  -3.8  3.0  4.3  7.1  6.5  2.8
index (1990=100)  100.0  73.7  80.3  77.2  79.5  82.9  88.8  94.6  97.3
afterinitialdecline  index(1991=100)  100.0  108.9  104.8  107.9  112.5  120.5  128.4  132.0
Slovenia  real growth  12.0  0.7  11.7  4.7  5.1  5.1  2.4  1.6
index(1990=100)  100.0 112.0  112.8  126.0  131.9  138.6  145.7  149.2  151.6
no initial decline
Source:  Employment and Labor Market country reports  prepared by the European Training Foundation (1999), and Central
Bank of Estonia.
1/ Hungarian Statistical  Office.
2/ Polish Statistical Office.
3/ Slovak Statistical  Office.
4/ Data for  1993-99 from Slovene  Statistical Office (rate of  growth of gross real wages).
13  In  spite  of these  developments,  unemployment  remained  low  in Slovenia  as  a result  of the  privatization
process that generated low dynamics in the labor market.
25IV.  What Explains these Labor Market Dynamics?
Labor  market  dynamics  can  be  seen  as  the  outcome  of interactions  between  labor
market  institutions  and other economic  forces.  In the  case of CEE countries,  the fall  of the
Soviet  Union  and  the  transition  from  command  to  market  economy  were  the  sources  of
tremendous economic shocks that necessarily interacted with the labor market.
Thus, whatever impact institutions may have had in the determination of labor market
dynamics,  they  were  clearly  not the  only  factors  affecting  labor market  outcomes  in  CEE
during the transition  years, particularly  during the early transition.  Factors outside the labor
market  had  an  enormous  impact  and  were  the  driving  force  behind  the  significant  shifts
observed  in the labor market at the beginning of the transition.  Big changes  in employment,
unemployment,  and  labor  force participation  could  not  have happened  without  stabilization
policies  and  structural  reform  measures.  The  relevant  question  is  whether  the  newly
introduced  labor  market  institutions  facilitated  (or  hindered)  these  changes  and  to  which
extent they affected the structure and composition of supply and demand.
This  section analyzes  first,  labor market  performance  during  the transition  from  the
perspective  of the impact  of other reform policies  that affected  labor market  outcomes.  We
pay  particular  attention  at  the  role  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  structural  reform
policies,  and  their  impact  on  labor  market  outcomes.  Second,  we  turn  our  attention  to  a
discussion of the role of labor market institutions.
A.  Macroeconomic  Stabilization Policies
Initial  conditions  were  an  important  factor  in  shaping  dynamics  of the  transition
process,  rather  than its outcome,  since  large  heterogeneity  existed  among  CEE  economies.
The degree  of centralization  and  state control,  imbalances  in macroeconomic  fundamentals,
both domestic and external,  the level of public indebtedness  and the degree of interaction with
the West varied tremendously among CEE countries before the transition.  This heterogeneity,
in  conjunction  with  the  developments  in the  political  elite  structure,  influenced  the policy
agenda of reform in a number of areas,  including the  speed of reforms,  how much FDI  was
embraced  as a restructuring  tool, the mechanism of privatization of state assets, the rigidity in
the imposition of hard budget  constraints, the degree of fiscal adjustment,  and the design of
the monetary policies  and the exchange  rate  regime.  Through  many of these channels,  the
26dynamics of the labor markets were affected  as the CEE economies  redefined their economic
interactions.
The need to cope with macroeconomic  stabilization in the early stages of the transition
focused  the  authorities  to  implement  reform  strategies  that  affected  labor and  other  factor
markets.  Inflation was  an important source of concern; particularly  in Estonia where  annual
inflation  rates peaked  at  1,069  percent in  1992,  but  also in Poland  and  Slovenia  (Table  9).
Tight monetary policy was essential to establish control  over inflation.  Some countries  also
opted  to use the  exchange  rate as a nominal  anchor  in an  attempt to cope  with inflationary
pressures.  This,  with  a  loose  fiscal  stance  limited  credit  to  the  private  sector  in  many
countries, slowing down the absorption of the unemployed.
Table 9. Inflation Rates in EU Accession  Countries.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Czech  Republic  10  57  11  21  10  9  9  9  11  2  4
Estonia  23  211  1069  90  48  29  23  11  8  3  8
Hungary  29  35  23  23  19  28  24  18  14  10  10
Poland  586  70  43  35  32  28  20  15  12  7  12
Slovak Republic  10  61  10  23  14  10  6  6  7  11  9
Slovenia  550  118  207  33  21  14  10  8  8  6  8
Sources: SIMA (WDI database and Unified Survey FYOI  database), National Authorities, IMF, and the Bank country team
estimates.
1/ Year-to-year change in annual Consumer Price Index,  in percentage.
The  need  to  ensure  fiscal  sustainability  forced  the  authorities  to  impose  fiscal
discipline  and  strong  fiscal  adjustment  measures.  As  a  result,  fiscal  policy  changed  its
supportive role.  This in turn reduced the availability of prevailing support mechanisms to the
economy, both in the form of price supports and direct or indirect subsidies de facto imposing
hard budget constraints to public enterprises  and forcing their restructuring (Table  10).
27Table 10. Subsidies to the Enterprise Sector in EU Accession  Countries (%  of GDP)
1989  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Czech Republic  25.0  4.4  3.1  2.7  2.2  2.4
Estonia  0.9  0.5  0.4  0.3
Hungary  12.1  4.1  4.5  3.8  3.9  3.3
Poland  12.9  3.0  3.3  2.9  2.5  2.4
Slovak Republic  25.0  4.8  3.2  2.8  2.4  2.2
Slovenia  1.6  1.6  1.2  1.3
Source: IMF (1994),  World Bank (2000).
Overall,  macroeconomic  stabilization  policies  helped  to  impose  hard  budget
constraints on the CEE  economies and encouraged  enterprise restructuring,  which forced the
reallocation  of labor and other factors of production from inefficient  sectors and activities to
efficient  ones.  This  produced  enormous  shifts  in  labor  demand  (and supply)  moving  away
from  industrial  and  agricultural  activities  into services,  and  from  the public  to the private
sector.  In  conjunction  with  price  liberalization  policies,  the  imposition  of hard  budget
constraints  triggered  the  breakdown  of  state  enterprises  and  helped  to  encourage  the
development  of  a  new  private  sector.  At  the  same  time  it  fostered  enterprise  sector
restructuring,  changing  the  face  of the  CEE  labor  markets.  As  a  result,  unemployment
appeared  as a  real and  open phenomenon  in CEE,  one that will require  the attention  of the
authorities  for  years  to  come.  Labor  force  participation  rates  also  changed  significantly,
particularly  with  the  withdrawal  of females  from  the  labor  force  and  the  use  of  early
retirement  schemes  in  some  countries  to  cope  with  the  growing  unemployment.  These
changes  reshaped  labor  markets  in  CEE  and  brought  them  to  resemble  European  labor
markets
B.  Structural Reforms
Structural reforms played an even more  important role in the shaping  of the dynamics
of labor  markets  during  the  transition.  Market  institutions  were  introduced  in  CEE  via
structural  reform  policies  that  liberalized  trade  and  domestic  prices,  eliminated  many state
monopolies  (particularly  important  was  the  monopoly  in  the  banking  systems),  privatized
state  enterprises,  promoted  (or  abstained  from  hindering)  the  development  of a  dynamic
private  sector,  facilitated  competition  and  efficiency,  and  redefined  property  rights  and the
legal and regulatory systems.  These reforms were critical to reshape the new CEE economies
28and had  a dramatic  impact on labor  and other factor  markets,  encouraging  reallocation  and
restructuring in the real sector.
With  the  liberalization  of  prices,  the  removal  of  restrictions  to  private  sector
development  and the reduction  in direct  and indirect  subsidies  hard budget  constraints  were
imposed to state firms, many of which could not cope with the new market conditions and the
competition  of the growing private sector.  The state sector declined, shedding labor while the
private  sector  was  growing.  However,  resources  released  from  the  public  sector were  not
fully absorbed by the private sector.  In part this was the result of skills mismatch, as the new
production  platforms  demanded  higher  educated  workers,  and workers  with different  skills,
but  the  lack of absorption  capacity  was  also  the  result  of other  factors  including  a weak
financial  sector that was  not capable  to  intermediate  resources  effectively,  thus limiting  the
availability of credit to the new private sector.
Banking crises compounded the credit problem affecting the capacity of firms to grow
and  generate  more  employment  opportunities.  As  a result  of all these  factors  employment
declined  and unemployment  grew rapidly  in the newborn  market economies.  As mentioned
above, employment levels have not recovered despite the return of strong output growth, thus
increasing productivity throughout the 1  990s (Figure 6).
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29While the factors mentioned  above  were common  in most transition  economies,  the
dynamics of labor markets varied from country to country as a rainbow of policy options were
implemented.  Some  countries,  like Poland,  used  early retirement  schemes to cope with the
growing  open  unemployment,  others,  like  Slovenia,  used  the  privatization  process  to  slow
down or even delay the adjustment of labor, maintaining the structure of employment as much
as possible  and reducing the speed of reform.  The use of a mix of different policies explain
the different labor adjustment dynamics.
Privatization  played  a  critical  role  in  shaping  these  labor  markets  dynamics,
accelerating  or retarding  the  adjustment  in the  real  sector  and  turnover  in  labor  markets.
Different  modalities  of privatization  of state  assets  were  introduced,  from  restitution  and
insider's  buyouts  (sometimes  at a  discount)  to  management  control  and  strategic  investors
involvement.  Mass  privatization  schemes  and  direct  sales  to  outsiders  (both  domestic  or
foreign)  completed  the picture  (Table  11).  These  different  privatization  techniques  imnplied
different  degrees  imposition  of hard  budget  constraints  to  the  firms  and  thus  different
adjustment paths.
Table 11.  Privatization Modalities for Medium and Large Enterprises in EU Accession
Countries.
Insider Buyouts  Mass Privatization  Sales  to Outsiders  Other'5
Program
Equal
Access  for  Large  Little
the Whole  Concessions  foreign  foreign
Employees"1 Managers2  Population  to Insiders  share`  share/4
Czech  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary
Republic
Estonia  Secondary  Primary  Tertiary
Hungary  Secondary  Primary  Tertiary
Poland  Primary  Secondary
Slovak  Prinary  Secondary
Republic
Slovenia  Secondary  Primary  Tertiary
Source:  World Bank (2000).
1/  Employees'  share exceeds  75 percent of total assets privatized.
2/ Management share exceeds  25 percent of total assets privatized.
3/ Foreign  share is  more than 25 percent of total assets sold.
4/ Foreign share is less than 25 percent of total assets sold.
5/ Includes restitution,  and assets sales through insolvency proceedings.
30Employment,  unemployment  and labor force participation levels were affected by the
privatization options used in combination with other structural reforms policies and the degree
of flexibility of labor markets.  For example, in Slovenia job turnover was slow as most firms
were  privatized  to  insiders  (managers,  workers  and  pensioners)  maintaining  the  status  quo.
Estonia  and Hungary focused  more on attracting  foreign  strategic investors,  accelerating  the
adjustment process and boosting job turnover.
The  initial  reform  focus  was on  privatization  and restructuring  of state  enterprises
rather than on facilitating  the development  of new firms  in the manufacturing  sector.  With
time small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) started to emerge in the manufacturing sector,
in spite of the limitations  imposed by the weak credit markets.  With hindsight more support
may  have  been  needed  to  SMEs  which  have  become  not  only  one  of the  key  engines  of
growth,  but also  one of the  few areas were  new job opportunities  have  been created  in the
manufacturing  sector.  Privatized  firms  engaged  much more in job destruction  than  in job
creation, relying on increases in productivity to survive.
Other  economic  policies  (or the  lack of thereof)  also  affected  the  dynamics  of key
labor market variables.  For instance, the housing  stock was determined  by the needs of the
previous  production  model,  thus  limiting  the  capacity  for  labor  mobility  and  reallocation
during  the  transition.  This  bottleneck  was reinforced  by a poorly  develop  (sometimes  non
existent) mortgage market. As a result, regional disparities in labor market outcomes emerged.
C.  Labor Market Institutions
From the previous analysis clearly emerges the conclusion that labor market dynamics
in  CEE  countries  were  significantly  affected  by  the  structural  reform  agenda.  The  sharp
decline  in total employment  and relative  increase  in private  sector employment,  the  shift in
economic  activity and reallocation of labor between  sectors, the changes in skill mix and the
reduction  in  real  wages  that  were  observed  over  one  decade  would  not have  happened
without wide-ranging structural reforms.
What has, then, been the impact of labor market institutions?  Should we consider it as
modest and relatively unimportant?  Although  data limitations do not permit  us to perform  a
thorough  econometric  analysis'4,  we  use evidence  drawn from previous  research to  make  a
14 Another caveat is the impossibility to evaluate the degree of enforcement of regulations  and policies.
31number  of observations  that  invite to a more cautious  conclusion.  In particular,  we  believe
that labor market  institutions  may have  contributed  to shaping  the  adjustment  of key  labor
market  variables,  affecting  the  rhythm  of  reform,  even  though  their  impact  may  have
"masked" by the dramatic impact of other refonns.
First, employment  levels have  not recovered.  Although output  started to grow in the
mid-nineties and has in some case surpassed the pre-transition levels (Poland, Slovenia),
Figure 7. Correlation between  GDP and Aggregate Employment Growth Rates in
EU Accession  Countries.
Czech  Republic, 1991-1999  Estonia,  1991-1998.
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32This is obviously a source of concern  as employment-to-population  ratios in CEE are
among  the  lowest  among  EU  and  OECD countries  (Table  AI.8).  Theory and  past research
does  suggest that  employment  levels  may be  affected negatively  by job  security provisions
(Lazear,  1990, Bertola,  1990, Hopenhayn  and Rogerson,  1997).  For  example, Lazear (1990)
using data from 22 countries (from Europe  and OECD) over a period of 29 years,  shows that
job security provisions - by increasing both the costs of hiring and laying off workers  - reduce
the  employment-to-population  ratio  and  increase  unemployment.  A  similar  conclusion  is
reached  by  Heckman  and  Pages  (2000)  who  analyzed  data  from  Latin  America  and  the
Caribbean.  Although the view that regulations  have no substantial  impact also prevail in the
literature  (Blank  and  Freeman,  1994;  Freeman,  2000),  one  cannot  dismiss  the  possible
negative impact of regulations on total employment.
Second, long-term  unemployment  is high  among CEE countries,  another  feature  that
has  been  found  as  associated  with  stricter  employment  protection  (Bentolila  and  Bertola,
1990; Nickell,  1997; Nickell  and Layard,  1998).  The unemployment  pool of CEE economies
has remained a fairly stagnant one, with low worker turnover and increasing numbers of long-
term unemployed individuals. Unemployment inflows and outflows, that is workers moving in
and out of unemployment,  represented on average  less than  10 percent of the overall stock of
unemployed  individuals.  This lack of dynamism  meant that the probability that the average
unemployed individual  left the unemployment pool was  small and, thus, over timne more and
more individuals  became  unemployed for more than a year.  In fact, in most countries of the
sample the share of long-term unemployed has grown throughout the 1990s (Table  12).
33Table 12.  Short- and Long-Term Unemployment  in EU Accession  Countries.
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1993-1998
Czech Republic  SRU'  3.2  3.0  2.8  2.7  3.3  4.5  5.5  3.3
LTU2  0.7  0.8  1.3  1.2  1.5  2.0  3.3  1.2
%  18.3  21.5  30.6  31.3  30.5  31.2  37.1  27.2
LTU3
Estonia  SRU  4.7  4.6  6.6  4.5  5.2  5.2  5.1
LTU  1.8  3.0  3.1  5.5  4.4  4.6  3.8
% LTU  27.6  39.5  31.9  55.0  45.8  46.9  42.7
Hungary  SRU  8.1  6.3  5.5  5.0  4.7  4.3  3.6  5.6
LTU  3.8  4.4  4.7  4.9  4.0  3.5  3.5  4.2
% LTU  32.2  41.3  45.6  49.8  46.5  44.3  49.5  43.3
Poland  SRU  9.9  10.1  9.0  8.6  7.0  6.6  8.5
LTU  5.0  6.4  6.2  5.7  4.5  4.0  5.3
% LTU  33.5  38.6  40.5  40.0  39.1  37.9  38.3
Slovakia  SRU  8.5  8.0  6.1  5.3  5.7  6.0  8.7  6.6
LTU  3.7  5.7  7.0  5.8  5.9  5.9  8.4  5.7
% LTU  30.2  41.6  53.1  52.7  51.5  49.7  49.1  46.4
Slovenia  SRU  2.9  2.3  1.8  2.4  2.1  1.8  2.2
LTU  6.2  6.8  5.6  4.9  5.3  6.1  5.8
% LTU  68.5  75.0  75.5  67.3  71.5  77.8  72.6
CEE average  % LTU  35.0  42.9  46.2  49.3  47.5  47.9  45.24  45.1
EUaverage  %LTU  41.45  42.86  45.8  45.3  45.6  43.97  41.27  44.1
OECD average  % LTU  39.15  40.46  43.2  42.7  43.0  41.17  39.07  41.6
United States  % LTU  11.5  12.2  9.7  9.5  8.7  8.0  6.8  9.5
Sources:  OECD-CCET Labor Market Database  1990-1997,  Slovene Labor Force Survey, and  Estonian Labor Force Survey
(1995  and  1997).
1/ Short-term unemployment.
2/ Long-term unemployment.
3 'Percentage  of total unemployment due to long-term unemployment.
4 'Includes  only the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia
5 ' Does not include Austria
6,' Does not include Finland.
7!  Does not include Ireland.
In this respect, CEE countries do resemble other European countries.  In contrast,  long-
term unemployed do not represent more than 7 percent of the pool of unemployed  in the US -
which has by far, the most flexible labor market.
In sum, although no firm conclusion can be reached, it is worthwhile noting that these
two  features  - low job  creation  and  high  long-term  unemployment  - have  often  been
34identified as associated  with inflexible labor markets.  Both may become the source of social
tensions and increasingly weigh on public budgets.
Third, it is hard to imagine  that changes  in the age and sex  composition  of the labor
force  have  not  been  - at  least partly - the  result  of institutional  changes  (introduction  of
unemployment  benefits,  early  retirement  schemes,  reduction  of child  care  support).  Indeed,
the overall decline in labor force participation  rates that we described in Section III  (Table  7)
masks  significant  differences  across demographic  groups,  with participation  rates falling  the
most  among women  and  older workers.  The reduction  in  the amount of child  care  support
provided  by  the  state  and  the  subsequent  increase  in  child  care  prices,  combined  with  a
decline in the number of child care centers and the tightening of social assistance for mothers
with  small  children,  led  numerous  women  to  exit the  labor  force  to  attend  their  children.
Similarly, the existence of support for the unemployed made it easier for employers to dismiss
workers  and  early retirement  schemes  made  it more attractive  for older workers to exit the
labor force. In many countries, those schemes were used as a device to control unemployment
among this particular group of workers.
High exit rates among certain groups of workers thus helped keep the unemployment
rate  below potentially  higher  levels.  For example,  in Hungary,  the  labor  force participation
rate  fell  to  11% for women  aged  55-64,  and to 30.8%  for men in 1999 (compared  to an EU
average of 30.5% and 52.7% respectively)  Moreover, 'selected exit', combined with the labor
market  entry of large  numbers  of young,  more  educated  workers,  substantially  altered  the
overall composition of the labor force in the CEE countries.  Whether labor force participation
rates can remain at low levels for long periods of time without incidence on the sustainability
of benefit systems may become an  issue in some of these countries.
Fourth,  CEE countries  stand out relative to EU countries with respect to payroll taxes
(and overall tax burden on labor) which are at the high end of the range (Table 5).  While past
research  has  not  shown  clear  evidence  of the  impact  of high  labor  taxes  on the  level  of
employment,  there  is  the  presumption  that  high taxes  on  labor create  incentives  for  self-
employment and an increase  in the informal  sector.  In this regard,  the effect of high payroll
35taxes may add to the effect of employment protection legislation'5. Available data for CEE are
scanty  and  subject  to  measurement  errors  but  they  suggest  that  this  hypothesis  may  be
relevant as the size of the informal sector in CEE countries is not insignificant.  (Table  13).
Table 13. Share of Unofficial  Economy in EU Accession  Countries.
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Czech Republic  6.0  6.7  12.9  16.9  16.9  17.6  11.3
Estonia  12.0  19.9  26.2  25.4  24.1  25.1  11.8
Hungary  27.0  28.0  32.9  30.6  28.5  27.7  29.0
Poland  15.7  19.6  23.5  19.7  18.5  15.2  12.6
Slovakia  6.0  7.7  15.1  17.6  16.2  14.6  5.8
Slovenia
Source: "Politics and Entrepreneurship  in Transition  Economies", Johnson et alia (1997).
It is important to emphasize  that there is significant variation  across the EU accession
countries  both in terms of the kinds of labor market institutions adopted and in terms of labor
market  outcomes,  and  that  significant  patterns  emerge  relating  the  two.  In  general,  those
countries that have undertaken more radical and liberal reforms appear to have more fluid and
dynamic  markets,  with  larger  job  and  worker  flows  (Vodopivec,  1999;  Haltiwanger  and
Vodopivec,  1999;  Bilsen  and Konings,  1998).  For example,  when we  compare  employment
accession  and  separation  rates  across  countries,  we  find  that  Hungary,  one  of the  most
reformist  countries,  exhibits  much  larger  flows  than  Slovenia,  a moderate  reformist  (Table
14).  We  illustrate  this  point  further  by  comparing job  and  worker  flows  in  Estonia  and
Slovenia in Box 3.
Table 14. Employment Accession  and Separation Rates in EU Accession  Countries.
Accession  Rate  Separation Rate
Czech Republic  (1994-98)  9.0
Estonia  (1989-91)  15.5  16.2
(1992-94)  27.3  29.3
(1995-97)  19.3  19.0
Hungary  (1991,  state firms)  20.6  30.5
Poland  (1991)  13.0  28.0
Slovakia
Slovenia  (1989-95)  13.0
(1990-96)  13.2  18.2
Source: Vodopivec (1999).
'5  Recent literature (Marquez,  1998; OECD,  1999; Kugler, 2000) suggests that job security provisions provide
incentives for self-employment and operation  in the informal sector.
36Box  3. The Importance of Institutions:
Job and Worker Flows During Transition in Estonia and Slovenia.
Following  Haltiwanger  and  Vodopivec  (1999),  and  Vodopivec  (1999)  we  compare the  experiences  of Estonia and  Slovenia  to
emphasize  the role that labor market  institutions  played  in  shaping up  labor market  outcomes  during the transition.  The pace of
institutional  reform  followed in both  countries differed substantially,  and  these differences had  a significant impact on job creation
and destruction,  and on  worker  accession  and  separation  rates.  While  Estonia pursued extremely  liberal,  radical  reforms,  Slovenia
retained  a considerable degree of employment protection  and adopted much more generous income support policies (Table B3. 1).
Table B3.1  Comparison of Labor Policies  in Transition.
Estonia  Slovenia
Policy  Change relative to  Change relative to
_  ____  ______  _  pr_transition  __  _  ____  _tnpre-transition_  __  _
Employment Protection  Job security removed  Job security removed
Liberal dismissal policies  Restrictive dismissal policies
No job preservation  subsidies  Job preservation subsidies
Unemployment  benefits  Duration: Maximum of 6 to 9 months  Duration: Maximum  of 24 months
Replacement  ratio:  10%  Replacement ratio:  60-70%
Wage  policies  Low minimum  wage  High minimum wage
Low tax wedge  High tax wedge
Collective  agreements  Low density and coverage  High density and coverage
Privatization  Individual sale methods  Mixed methods
Foreign trade  No tariffs/quotas  on imports  Up to 28% tariff rates
FDI 1989-96  Cumulative  inflow per capita: $459  Cumulative inflow per capita:  $366
Maternity leave  Increased  from  1.5  to  3  years  plus  10  weeks  Remained at  I year
pregnancy  leave
Public childcare  Price increases
14% decrease in number of centers  1% increase in number of  centers
Income support  Up  to  4  year  extension  of Ul  for  women  with  No change
children under 6
Source: Orazem and Vodopivec (1999)
The authors show that in Estonia both job destruction and, with a lag, job creation rates increased tremendously during the transition.
In  contrast,  more protectionist  and generous policies in Slovenia resulted in much  lower rates.  For instance, job  creation rates -for
which  differences  between both countries are biggest - were  at or below  I percent a year in Slovenia during  1989-94,  while they
kept  increasing  up  to  10  percent  in  Estonia  In  addition, job destruction  rates  differed  significantly  between  both  countries.  In
Estonia job destruction grew rapidly from 1989 to 1992, going from almost 0 percent to  14 percent, to decline slightly afterwards.  In
contrast,  the  Slovenian  rate  started  to  exhibit  a  declining  trend  as  early  as  1991  and always  remained  below  60  percent of the
Estonian rate (Figure B3. 1).
It is also interesting to note that the comparison with  Slovenia does not seem to be a special case since job flows  in Estonia are also
much higher than those reported for some other non-radical  reformers such as Bulgaria, Hungary or Rumania (Bilsen and Konings,
1998).
37Box 3 (continued).
The differences  in employment accession  and separation  rates are even more striking.  While Estonia underwent  a period of
tremendous worker turnover  (i.e. high accession  and separation rates) between 1989 and 1994, worker flows remained fairly
stable in Slovenia (Figure B3.2), exhibiting almost no trend.
Figure B3.1 Rate of Job Destruction in Estonia and Slovenia  during Transition
Rate of Job Desartion
2
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These differences  in job  and  worker flows between  the two countries  are attributed  by the  authors to differences  in  both
labor market institutions and speed of reforms (for instance,  as mentioned earlier,  there were substantial differences  in their
approach to privatization).
Figure B3.2 Employment Accession  and Separation in Estonia and Slovenia  during Transition
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Source: Ha,tiwanger and Vodopivec (1999); Vodopivec (1999).
Finally,  it  seems  difficult  to  evaluate  at this  stage  the  impact of wage  bargaining
without further research.  Past research has  shown that institutions  associated  with collective
bargaining  tend  to  reduce  the  dispersion  of earnings.  In  CEE  countries,  changes  in  the
bargaining  system have  been accompanied  by a sharp increase in private  sector employment
and a decompression of the wage  structure.  It is difficult to assess to which extent institutions
and social  norrns  inherited  from the  past still play  a role in the wage  determination  process
38and whether wage inequality - although clearly increasing - has reached levels comparable to
other countries.
V.  Conclusions
In this paper,  we have  studied labor market  dynamics  in six CEE  countries  over the
last  10  years,  paying  special  attention  to  the  nature  of the  labor  market  institutions  these
countries  have recently  adopted and to  their impact on labor market  performance.  We have
done so using the OECD methodology so that we could compare institutions in CEE countries
seeking EU membership with those in EU and OECD countries. This exercise  was motivated
by the desire  to  shed  some light on the ongoing  debate  on the  role  of  institutions  in labor
market  performance,  a  debate  of  particular  relevance  to  countries  in  Europe  where
unemployment  remains high on the list of policy concerns.
The  first  question  we  addressed  was  whether  CEE  countries  - candidates  for  EU
accession  - had  adopted  institutions  similar  to  those  in  the  EU  and,  as  a  consequence,
introduced in their labor markets the same rigidities that exist in EU countries. We found that,
indeed,  the  CEE  countries  have  adopted  a  set  of labor  market  institutions  that  broadly
resemble those  in the EU.  However, just as labor markets  and institutions  in Europe exhibit
enormous  diversity,  we  find  variation  across  the  CEE  countries  in terms  of employment
protection legislation,  support to the unemployed, taxation on labor and strength of unions.
Compared to  EU members,  we  showed that  CEE countries  fall in the middle  of the
'flexibility'  scale  regarding  their  employment  protection  legislation. They  have  not adopted
legislation  as  flexible  as  that in  the  United  Kingdom  or Ireland,  nor have  they  copied  the
highly  rigid  southern  European  model.  They  also  spend  relatively  little  to  support  the
unemployed,  as measured by the share of every dollar generated by a labor force member that
is  spent  on  unemployment  insurance  or  active  labor  market  policies.  The  CEE  average
spending in both passive and active  labor market policies  falls below the EU and the OECD
average,  and  the  behavior of these  countries  resembles  that of the United  States,  Japan  and
Southern  Europe,  rather  than  that  of Denmark  or  Sweden  in  this  respect.  Where  CEE
countries stand out is in terms of labor taxation  where they rank among the highest in all EU
and OECD countries.
39In assessing  the impact  of those  institutions  on labor outcomes,  we  argued  that the
dramatic  changes  observed  during  the  1990s  in employment,  unemployment,  labor  force
participation  and wages  could not have occurred  without the macroeconomic  and  structural
reforms these countries have embraced as part of the transition process. As a result, the effect
of institutions  may  have  been  masked  by  the  magnitude  of these  other  reform-induced
changes.
We also  assert that the effect of institutions, although hard to  uncover,  should not be
disregarded.  Although  institutions  may  not  have  played  a substantial  role  during  the  first
phase  of adjustment,  they  are  likely  to  become  more  important  in the next  few  years.  In
particular,  we have  tried to show,  using  evidence  drawn from  other  research,  that existing
labor  market  institutions,  although  moderate,  may  be  partly  responsible  for  the  lack  of
recovery  of employment  and the rising share of long-term  unemployment.  While the impact
on total unemployment remains uncertain, data also suggest that institutions  in CEE countries
may well have an impact on the composition of the labor force and of  employment.
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44Table AI.l. Employment  Protection Legislation  in OECD and EU Accession  Countries (I).
Regular  Temporary  Collective  EPL Strictness for OECD and CEEC
Empl.  Empl.  Dismissals  OECD vs. CEEC
Version  11  Version 22
Index  Rank3 Index  Rank3
OECD
Austria  2.6  1.8  3.3  2.2  12  2.3  12
Belgium  1.5  2.8  4.1  2.1  10  2.5  13
Denmark  1.6  0.9  3.1  1.2  8  1.5  8
Finland  2.1  1.9  2.4  2.0  9  2.1  9
France  2.3  3.6  2.1  3.0  17  2.8  17
Germany  2.8  2.3  3.1  2.5  15  2.6  16
Ireland  1.6  0.3  2.1  0.9  4  1.1  5
Italy  2.8  3.8  4.1  3.3  19  3.4  19
Netherlands  3.1  1.2  2.8  2.1  11  2.2  10
Norway  2.4  2.8  2.8  2.6  16  2.6  15
Portugal  4.3  3.0  3.6  3.7  20  3.7  20
Spain  2.6  3.5  3.1  3.1  18  3.1  18
Sweden  2.8  1.6  4.5  2.2  13  2.6  14
Switzerland  1.2  0.9  3.9  1.0  6  1.5  7
U.K.  0.8  0.3  2.9  0.5  2  0.9  2
Canada  0.9  0.3  3.4  0.6  3  1.1  4
U.S.  0.2  0.3  2.9  0.2  1  0.7  1
Japan  2.7  2.1  1.5  2.4  14  2.3  11
Australia  i.o  0.9  2.6  0.9  5  1.2  6
New Zealand  1.7  0.4  0.4  1.0  7  0.9  3
EU average 5 2.4  2.1  3.2  2.2  2.4
OECD average'  2.0  1.7  2.9  1.9  2.0
CEEC
Czech Rep.  2.8  0.5  4.3  1.7  3  2.1  3
Estonia  3.1  1.4  4.1  2.3  5  2.6  5
Hungary  2.1  0.6  3.4  1.4  1  1.7  1
Poland  2.2  1.0  3.9  1.6  2  2.0  2
Slovakia  2.6  1.4  4.4  2.0  4  2.4  4
Slovenia  3.4  2.4  4.8  2.9  6  3.5  6
Slovenia4 (2.9)  (0.6)  (4.9)  (1.8)  (4)  (2.3)  (4)
CEEC average  2.7  1.2  4.1  2.0  2.4
Source: OECD (1999)  Employment Outlook  1999, Table 2.5. World Bank estimates for Estonia and Slovenia.
1/ Weighted  average of indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts.
2/ Weighted average  of indicators for regular contracts,  temporary contracts, and collective dismissals.
3/ All rankings increase with the strictness of employment protection.
4/ Based on proposed labor code.
5/ Does not include Greece and Luxemburg.
5/ Average  for all OECD countries presented on the table.
45Table Al.2.  Employment Protection Legislation  in OECD and EU Accession  Countries (II).
EPL Strictness for OECD and CEEC
OECD versus CEEC  OECD and CEEC
Version  1i  Version 22  Version  11  Version 22
Index  Rank3 Index  Rank3 Rank3 Rank3
OECD
Austria  2.2  12  2.3  12  16  15
Belgium  2.1  10  2.5  13  14  17
Denmark  1.2  8  1.5  8  8  8
Finland  2.0  9  2.1  9  13  12
France  3.0  17  2.8  17  22  22
Germany  2.5  15  2.6  16  20  21
Ireland  0.9  4  1.1  5  4  5
Italy  3.3  19  3.4  19  25  24
Netherlands  2.1  11  2.2  10  15  13
Norway  2.6  16  2.6  15  21  20
Portugal  3.7  20  3.7  20  26  26
Spain  3.1  18  3.1  18  23  23
Sweden  2.2  13  2.6  14  17  19
Switzerland  1.0  6  1.5  7  6  7
U.K.  0.5  2  0.9  2  2  2
Canada  0.6  3  1.1  4  3  4
U.S.  0.2  1  0.7  1  1  1
Japan  2.4  14  2.3  11  19  14
Australia  0.9  5  1.2  6  5  6
New Zealand  1.0  7  0.9  3  7  3
EU average
5 2.2  2.4
OECD average6  1.9  2.0
CEEC
Czech Republic  1.7  3  2.1  3  11  11
Estonia  2.3  5  2.6  5  18  18
Hungary  1.4  1  1.7  1  9  9
Poland  1.6  2  2.0  2  10  10
Slovakia  2.0  4  2.4  4  12  16
Slovenia  2.9  6  3.5  6  24  25
Slovenia4 (1.8)  (4)  (2.3)  (4)  (12)  (16)
CEEC average  2.0  2.4
Source:  OECD (1999)  Employment Outlook 1999, World Bank estimates for Estonia and Slovenia.
1/ Weighted average  of indicators for regular contracts  and temporary  contracts.
2/ Weighted average of indicators for regular  contracts, temporary contracts,  and collective dismissals.
3/ All rankings increase with the strictness of employment protection.
4/ Based on proposed labor code.
5/ Does not include Greece and Luxemburg
5/ Average  for all OECD countries in the table.
46Table AI.3.  Features of the Unemployment  Insurance System  in Selected OECD and EU Accession
Countries. Late 1990s.
Benefit RR  Benefit Duration
(%)  (months)
OECD
Austria  50  5-12
Belgium  57  12 -No limit
Denmark  70  60
Finland  63  24
France  70  27 -54
Germany  61  6 - 32
Ireland  49  15
Italy  42  6
Netherlands  69  6 - 54
Norway  67  46
Portugal  65  10 - 30
Spain  73  4 - 24
Sweden  75  12-18
Switzerland  73  8.5-20
U.K  36  12
Canada  59  12
U.S.  60  6
Japan  60  6
Australia  36  No limit





Czech Republic  50  6
Estonia  1 5 3-6
Hungary  64  126
Poland  407  12_24"
Slovakia  60  6-129
Slovenia  63  3-249
CEEC average  48 (55)_0
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook (1995,  1999),  IMF World Economic  Outlook (1999),  IMF Article  IV - Consultation
with the  Slovak  Republic,  World  Bank estimates  for Estonia  and  Slovakia,  Czech Republic: Towards EU Accession  (The
World Bank, 1999), Slovak Republic: A Strategy for Growth and Economic Integration (The World Bank,  1998).
1/ Description  of categories:  (i) Benefit  RR - Benefit Replacement  Ratio - initial  benefit level  divided  by previous  earned
income,  (ii) Benefit Duration - Benefit Duration - maximum  duration,  in months, depending on  various criteria (age, family
status, employment record/  contributive history).
2/ Data for Czech Republic,  Estonia and  Slovenia  are from  1998;  data for Hungary  are from  1997, and  data for  Poland and
Slovakia are from 1996.
3/ Does not include Greece and Luxemburg.
4/ Average for all OECD countries  in the table.
5/ Benefits are set at 60% of minimum wage. This amounts to approximately  10% of the average wage.
6! Requires 4 years of employment.
7/ The replacement  ratio is 40% of the average wage for the year prior to unemployment.
8/ Benefit duration increases with previous employment  tenure.
9/ Benefit duration is a function of the worker's contributive  history.
10/ Figure in parentheses  does not include Estonia.
47Table Al.4. Spending on Passive and Active Labor Market Policies  in Selected  OECD
and EU Accession  Countries 1.
Unemployment  Passive policies  Active  policies
rate  % GDP  Spending per  %  GDP  Spending per
unemployment.  unemployment.
OECD
Austria (1999)  3.7  1.22  0.32  0.52  0.14
Belgium (1998)  9.5  2.51  0.26  1.34  0.14
Denmark (1999)  5.2  3.12  0.60  1.77  0.34
Finland (1999)  10.3  2.33  0.23  1.22  0.12
France(1999)  11.3  1.85  0.16  1.33  0.12
Germany (1999)  8.7  2.12  0.24  1.30  0.15
Greece (1997)  9.8  0.50  0.05  0.35  0.04
Ireland (1996)  11.7  2.42  0.21  1.66  0.14
Italy(l999)  11.4  0.64  0.06  1.10  0.10
Netherlands (1999)  3.3  2.81  0.85  1.80  0.55
Norway (1999)  3.3  0.47  0.14  0.82  0.25
Portugal (1996/98)  5.2  0.83  0.16  0.87  0.12
Spain (1999)  15.9  1.41  0.09  0.81  0.o-
Sweden (1999)  7.2  1.70  0.24  1.84  0.26
Switzerland  (1997/98)  4.2  1.03  0.25  0.41  0.10
U.K. (1997198)  7.0  0.82  0.12  0.37  0.05
Canada (1998/99)  8.3  0.99  0.12  0.51  0.06
U.S.  (1998/99)  4.5  0.25  0.06  0.18  0.04
Japan (1998/99)  4.1  0.52  0.13  0.09  0.02
Australia (1998/99)  8.0  1.06  0.13  0.52  0.07
New Zealand (1998/99)  7.4  1.57  0.21  0.62  0.08
EU average4 1.73  0.26  1.16  0.16
OECD average 
5 1.43  0.23  0.92  0.14
CEEC
Czech Republic  (1999)  8.8  0.31  0.04  0.19  0.02
Estonia (1998)  9.9  0.08  0.01  0.08  0.01
Hungary (1997)  8.7  0.56  0.06  0.40  0.04
Poland  (1996)  14.3  1.71  0.12  0.49  0.03
Slovakia (1996)  11.1  0.54  0.05  0.56  0.05
Slovenia  (1998)  7.9  0.89  0.11  0.83  0.11
CEEC average  0.68  0.06  0.42  0.04
Source:  OECD Employment  Outlook (1997,  1999),  CEM Slovak Republic, ELFS (1998), RZS (1999).
Data for 1996, 1997 and 1999.
1/ Data from different years (in parentheses)
2/  Spending Measure  1: Ratio of GDP spending on UI to unemployment rate (both in percentage terms.
3/ Spending Measure 2: Spending per unemployed individual as a percentage of GDP per labor force participant.
4/ Does not include Luxemburg.
4/ Average for all OECD countries in the table.
48Table AI.5.  The Role of Unions and Payroll Taxes in Selected  OECD
and EU Accession  Countries.
_____  1'  2  3  4  5
Union density  Union  Coordination  Payroll tax rate  Total tax rate
(%)2  coverage  Union  Employer  (%)  (%)
index3
OECD
Austria  41.2  3  3  3  22.6  53.7
Belgium  51.9  3  2  2  21.5  49.8
Denmark  80.1  2  3  3  0.6  46.3
Finland  79.3  3  2  3  25.5  65.9
France  9.1  3  2  2  38.8  63.8
Germany  28.9  3  2  3  23.0  53.0
Ireland  48.9  3  1  1  7.1  34.3
Italy  44.1  3  2  2  40.2  62.9
Netherlands  25.6  3  2  2  27.5  56.5
Norway  57.7  2  3  3  17.5  48.6
Portugal  25.6  3  2  2  14.5  37.6
Spain  18.6  3  2  1  33.2  54.2
Sweden  91.1  3  3  3  37.7  70.7
Switzerland  22.5  2  1  3  14.5  28.6
U.K.  32.9  2  1  1  13.8  40.8
Canada  37.4  2  1  1  13.0  42.7
U.S.  14.2  1  1  1  20.9  43.8
Japan  24.0  2  2  2  16.5  36.3
Australia  35.2  3  2  1  2.5  28.7
New Zealand  24.3  1  1  1  34.8
EU average'  44.4  23.5  53.0
OECD averages  39.6  19.5  45.4
CEEC
Czech Republic  42.8  2  1  1  47.5  73.4
Estonia  36.1  2  2  1  33.0  63.3
Hungary  60.0  3  1  2  44.0  81.5
Poland  33.8  3  2  1  48.2  80.0
Slovakia  61.7  3  2  2  50.0  81.0
Slovenia  60.0  3  3  3  38.0  69.1
CEEC average  49.1  43.4  74.7
Source:  Columns  I  (except  Slovenia)  and  2 (except  Czech  Republic  and Hungary)  from  ILO (1997)  World  Labor Report
1997-98  and  OECD Employment  Outlook  (1997);  data  for Slovenia,  the  Czech  Republic  and Hungary  estimated  by the
World Bank.  Column 3  and  4, and  tax rates  for the OECD  from Nickell  (1997).  Columns  3, 4 and tax rates for the CEEC
from  (i)  Deloitte  Touche  Tohmatsu  International  - Taxation  in Eastern  Europe  (1997),  (ii)  Bank  of Estonia,  (iii)  Polish
Agency for Foreign  Investment, (iv) EIU (1998), and (v) Labour  Regulations in Eastern Europe, Business Eastern Europe.
1/ All data for1 995, except for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden (1993),  and estimated data for Slovenia.
2/ Percentage of salaried workers that belong to a union.
3/ 1:  less than 25% of salaried workers are covered by collective  agreements, 2:  between 26 and 69% are covered,  3: 70%  or
more are covered.
4/ Does  not include Greece and Luxemburg.
5/ Average  for all OECD countries in the table.
49Table Al.6 GDP in EU Accession  Countries: Growth Rates and Levels.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Czech Republic  Growth rate  -1.2  -11.6  -0.5  0.1  2.2  5.9  4.8  -1.0  -2.2  -0.2  2.7
Level  (1990=100)  100  88.4  88.0  88.0  90.0  95.3  99.9  98.9  96.7  96.5  99.1
Estonia  Growth rate  -7.1  -8.0  -21.2  -8.4  -2.0  4.3  3.9  10.6  4.7  -1.1  5.0
Level  (1990=100)  100  92.0  72.5  66.4  65.1  67.9  70.5  78.0  81.7  80.8  84.8
Hungary  Growth rate  -3.5  -11.9  -3.1  -0.6  2.9  1.5  1.3  4.6  4.9  4.5  5.6
Level (1990=100)  100  88.1  85.4  84.9  87.4  88.7  89.9  94.0  98.6  103.1  114.6
Poland  Growth rate  -4.9  -7.0  2.6  3.8  5.2  7.0  6.0  6.8  4.8  4.1  2.2
Level(1990=100)  100  93.0  95.4  99.0  104.2  111.5  118.2  126.3  132.4  137.8  150.5
Slovak Republic  Growth rate  -2.7  -14.6  -6.7  -3.7  4,9  6.7  6.2  6.2  4.1  1.9  1.8
Level (1990=100)  100  85.4  79.7  76.7  80.5  85.9  91.2  96.9  100.9  102.8  108.3
Slovenia  Growth rate  -4.7  -8.9  -5.4  2.8  5.3  4.1  3.5  4.6  3.9  4.9  4.5
Level (1990=100)  100  91.1  86.2  88.6  93.3  97.1  100.5  105.1  109.2  114.6  124.8
Sources:  SIMA (WDI database and Unified Survey  FYOI  database), National Authorities,  IMF, and the World Bank country team estimates.
50Table Al.7  Employment  in EU Accession  Countries: Growth Rates and Levels.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
growth  -1.8  -0.9  -0.5  -0.3  1.7  -3  -1.6  -1.4  -2.3  -1.5
Czech Republic  index  (1990=100)  100.0  98.2  97.3  96.8  96.5  98.2  95.2  93.7  92.4  90.3  88.9
growth  -9.6  -9.3  -6.3  -2  -1.9  -0.8  -0.1  1.5  3.1  2.7
Hungary  index (1990=100)  100.0  90.4  82.0  76.8  75.3  73.9  73.3  73.2  74.6  76.9  79.0
growth  -2.3  -5.2  -7.5  -2.2  -5.3  -1.6  0.4  -1.3
Estonia  index (1990=100)  100.0  97.7  92.6  85.7  83.8  79.4  78.1  78.5  77.5
Poland  growth  -5  -5.9  -4.2  -2.4  1  1.8  1.9  2.8  1.9  -0.2  -0.5
index (1990=100)  100.0  94.1  90,1  88.0  88.9  90.5  92.2  94.8  96.6  96.4  95.9
Slovakia  growth  -1.8  -12.5  1.1  -2.6  -I  2.4  -1.4  -2.3  -1.0  -1.4  -1.1
index (1990=100)  100.0  87.5  88.5  86.2  85.3  87.3  86.1  83.8  82.9  81.7  80.0
Slovenia  growth  -3.9  -5.1  -4.1  -1.8  0.3  0.8  -0.9  0.0  0.2  1.8  1.3
index(1990=100)  100.0  94.9  91.0  89.4  89.6  90.4  89.5  89.5  89.6  91.2  92.3
Source: Employment and Labor Market country reports prepared by the European  Training Foundation (1999), and EBRD Transition Report (1999).
51Table AI.8 Employment-to-Population  Ratios  in EU Accession  Countries.
____________  ____________  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Czech  Republic  All (15-64)  71.5  69.6  69.4  68.7  67.5  65.9
Female (15-64)  66.2  61.6  60.6  60.0  58.8  57.4
Estonia  All (15-64)  68.7  68.1  65.5  64.9  65.4  64.7
Female (15-64)  62.6  62.0  60.5  60.2  60.4  60.4
Hungary  All  (15-64)  48.2  52.9  52.7  52.7  55.3  55.7
Female (15-64)  41.9  45.9  45.5  45.5  47.3  49.0
Poland  All (15-64)  58.3  58.1  58.4  58.8  58.9
Female (15-64)  51.9  51.8  51.8  51.8  52.2
Slovakia  All  (15-64)  61.1  62.3  63.2  59.7  58.8
Female (15-64)  56.0  56.8  57.5  53.1  52.6
Slovenia  All (15-64)  60.7  60.3  62.9  61.9  63.4  63.7
Female (15-64)  56.5  56.0  58.0  57.7  58.9  59.6
Source:  Employment and Labor Market country reports  prepared by the European  Training  Foundation (1999),  Statistical  Office of Estonia,  and
OECD Employment Outlook  (1999).
52Table Al.9 Unemployment  Rates in EU Accession  Countries.
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Czech  Republic  Survey  3.9  3.8  4.1  3.9  4.8  6.5  8.8
Registered  4.1  2.6  3.5  3.2  2.9  3.5  5.2  7.5  9.6
Estonia  Survey'  0.6  1.5  3.7  6.5  7.6  9.7  10.0  9.7  9.9  11.7
Registered  4.4  4.1  4.4  4.0  3.7  5.1
Hungary  Survey  9.8  11.9  10.7  10.2  9.9  8.7  7.8  7.1
Registered  1.4  7.4  12.3  12.1  10.4  10.4  10.5  10.4  8.8
Poland  Survey  14.9  16.5  15.2  14.3  11.5  10.6  12.0
Registered  6.5  12.2  14.3  16.4  16.0  14.9  13.2  10.3  10.4  11.5
Slovakia  Survey  12.2  13.7  13.1  11.1  11.6  12.5  17.1
Registered 2 1.5  11.8  10.4  14.2  14.6  13.1  12.8  13.4  16.4  19.2
Slovenia  Survey  9.1  9.0  7.4  7.3  7.1  7.9
Registered  4.7  8.2  11.5  14.4  14.5  14.0  13.9  14.4  14.5
EU-I5 Average  Survey  7.0  7.7  8.9  10.1  10.3  9.8  9.8  9.2  8.3  7.6
EU- Group 1 (North)2 Survey  4.9  5.9  7.5  9.2  9.5  8.5  8.3  7.5  6.7  6.0
EU-  Group 2 (Central)3 Survey  7.6  8.0  8.7  8.5  9.0  8.9  9.4  9.7  9.5  8.8
EU-  Group 3 (South) 4 Survey  10.2  10.6  11.5  13.2  13.6  12.9  12.7  11.8  10.5  12.45
United states  Survey  5.6  6.8  7.5  6.9  6.1  5.6  5.4  4.9  4.5  4.2
Source: Employment and Labor Market country  reports prepared by the European Training Foundation (1999), EBRD Transition  Report (1999), Central  Bank of Estonia, and
OECD Employment Outlook (1999).
1/ Data from Social Policy (1998), Ministry  of Labor,  Family and  Social Affairs.
2/ Includes  Finland, Sweden,  Denmark,  United Kingdom,  and Benelux.
3/ Includes  Germany, France, Austria  and Italy.
4/ Includes Portugal,  Spain, Greece  and Ireland.
5/ Only Portugal and  Spain.
53Table AI.10 Unemployment  Inflows  and Outflows  in EU Accession  Countries.
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Cech Republic  Annual average  inflow ratel  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6
Annual average outflow rate2 17.1  26.6  22.0  21.3  21.3  19.3
Estonia3 Annual average  inflow rate
Annual average  outflow rate
Hungary  Annual average  inflow rate  0.9  1.3  1.1  1.0  1.3
Annual average  outflow rate  6.6  7.7  9.1  7.9  9.4
Poland  Annual  average inflow rate  0.9  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.2
Annual  average outflow rate  4.3  4.8  6.2  8.0  8.2
Slovakia  Annual average inflow rate  1.3  1.1  1.5  1.3  1.4  1.4
Annual  average outflow rate  4.8  10.2  7.8  7.4  9.5  10.0
Slovenia  Annual average  inflow rate4 6.7  8.4  9.0
Annual  average outflow rate4986997
Source: Terrell (1999) and Employment and Labor Market country reports prepared by the European  Training Foundation (1999).
1/  Average annual rates of the number flowing  into unemployment divided by the number employed and multiplied by 100.
2/ Average annual rates of the number flowing out of unemployment  divided by the number unemployed  and multiplied by 100.
3/  Data not available.
2/ Average annual rates for the number flowing in  and out of unemployment  divided by the number  unemployed and multiplied by 100 (based on monthly rates).
54Table AI.11  Unemployment  Rates in Selected  OECD Countries.
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1993-98/99
Austria  Survey  4.0  3.8  3.9  4.4  4.5  4.7  3.7  4.1
Belgium  Survey  8.9  10.0  9.9  9.7  9.2  8.8  9.0  9.4
Denmark  Survey  10.1  8.2  7.3  6.8  5.6  5.1  5.2  6.9
Finland  Survey  16.4  16.8  15.3  14.6  12.7  11.4  10.3  13.9
France  Survey  11.7  12.3  11.7  12.4  12.3  11.7  11.3  11.9
Germany  Survey  7.9  8.4  8.2  8.9  9.9  9.4  8.7  8.8
Greece  Survey  8.6  8.9  9.2  9.6  9.6  10.7  9.4
Ireland  Survey  15.6  14.3  12.3  11.6  9.9  7.8  11.9
Italy  Survey  10.3  11.4  11.9  12.0  12.1  11.9  11.4  11.6
Luxemburg  Survey  2.7  3.2  2.9  3.0  2.8  2.8  2.3  2.8
Netherlands  Survey  6.6  7.1  6.9  6.3  5.2  4.0  3.3  5.6
Portugal  Survey  5.7  7.0  7.3  7.3  6.8  4.9  4.5  6.2
Spain  Survey  22.7  24.1  22.9  22.2  20.8  18.8  15.9  21.0
Sweden  Survey  9.1  9.4  8.8  9.6  9.9  8.2  9.2
United Kingdom  Survey  10.5  9.6  8.7  8.2  7.0  6.3  6.1  8.0
United States  Survey  6.9  6.1  5.6  5.4  4.9  4.5  4.2  5.4
EU-15 Average  Survey  10.1  10.3  9.8  9.8  9.2  8.3  7.6  9.3
Source: OECD Employment  Outlook (1999).
55Table AI.12 Short and Long-Term  Unemployment  in Selected  OECD Countries.
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Austria  SRU'  3.1  2.9  3.3  3.2  3.3  2.5
LTU2 0.7  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.4  1.2
%  LTU3 18.5  25.6  25.6  28.7  30.2  31.7
Belgium  SRU  4.2  4.2  3.7  3.8  3.6  3.3  3.6
LTU  4.7  5.8  6.2  5.9  5.6  5.5  5.4
%  LTU  53.0  58.3  62.4  61.3  60.5  62.6  60.5
Denmark  SRU  7.6  5.6  5.3  5.0  4.1  3.6  4.1
LTU  2.5  2.6  2.0  1.8  1.5  1.5  1.1
%  LTU  25.1  32.1  27.9  26.5  27.2  28.7  20.5
Finland  SRU  11.4  9.5  9.6  8.9  8.3  7.3
LTU  5.0  5.8  5.0  3.8  3.1  3.0
% LTU  30.6  37.6  34.5  29.8  27.5  29.6
France  SRU  7.7  7.6  6.8  7.5  7.2  6.5  6.7
LTU  4.0  4.7  4.9  4.9  5.1  5.2  4.6
% LTU  34.2  38.3  42.3  39.5  41.2  44.1  40.3
Germany  SRU  4.7  4.7  4.2  4.6  4.9  4.5  4.2
LTU  3.2  3.7  4.0  4.3  5.0  4.9  4.5
% LTU  40.0  43.9  48.7  47.8  50.1  52.2  51.7
Ireland  SRU  3.8  6.0  4.7  4.6  4.9
LTU  11.8  8.3  7.6  6.9  5.6
%  LTU  75.9  57.8  61.4  59.5  57.0
Italy  SRU  4.4  4.5  4.3  4.1  4.1  4.1  4.4
LTU  5.9  6.9  7.6  7.9  8.0  8.1  7.0
% LTU  57.3  60.8  63.6  65.6  66.3  68.1  61.4
Netherlands  SRU  3.6  4.0  3.7  3.2  2.6  2.1  1.9
LTU  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.2  2.6  1.9  1.4
% LTU  45.4  43.5  46.8  50.0  49.1  47.9  43.5
Portugal  SRU  3.7  4.1  3.6  3.4  3.0  2.7  2.6
LTU  2.0  2.9  3.7  3.9  3.8  2.2  1.9
% LTU  32.5  41.8  50.9  53.1  55.6  44.6  41.2
Spain  SRU  11.3  10.6  9.9  9.8  9.3  8.6  7.7
LTU  11.4  13.5  13.0  12.4  11.5  10.2  8.2
% LTU  50.1  56.1  56.9  55.7  55.5  54.1  51.3
Sweden  SRU  8.1  7.8  6.4  6.7  6.6  5.5
LTU  1.0  1.6  2.4  2.9  3.3  2.7
%  LTU  10.9  17.2  27.8  30.1  33.4  33.5
United  kingdom  SRU  6.0  5.2  4.9  4.9  4.3  4.2  4.3
LTU  4.5  4.4  3.8  3.3  2.7  2.1  1.8
% LTU  42.5  45.4  43.6  39.8  38.6  33.1  29.8
United states  SRU  6.1  5.4  5.1  4.9  4.5  4.1  3.9
LTU  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
% LTU  11.5  12.2  9.7  9.5  8.7  8.0  6.8
Source: OECD-CCET Labor Market Database 1990-1997, and OECD Employment  Outlook (1999, 2000).
1/ Short-term unemployment.
2/ Long-term unemployment.
3/ Percentage of total unemployment due to long-term unemployment.
56Table Al.13  Labor Force Participation Rates in Selected  OECD Countries.
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
EU-15 Average  All (15-64)  60.1  61.1  61.4  62.0  63.0
Female (15-64)  57.1  57.6  58.3  58.7  59.4
Austria  All (15-64)  ...  68.4  67.3  67.2  67.4
Female (15-64)  62.3  61.8  61.8  62.5
Belgium  All (15-64)  55.7  56.3  56.3  57.0  57.3
Female (15-64)  51.2  51.7  52.0  52.9  53.8
Denmark  All (15-64)  72.4  73.9  74.0  75.4  75.3
Female (15-64)  73.8  73.3  73.6  74.2  75.0
Finland  All (15-64)  60.7  61.9  62.8  63.6  64.8
Female (15-64)  69.1  69.5  69.9  69.5  69.7
France  All (15-64)  58.3  59.0  59.2  58.8  59.4
Female(15-64)  59.2  59.8  60.3  60.1  60.8
Germany  All (15-64)  64.7  64.7  64.1  63.6  64.1
Female (15-64)  61.4  61.3  61.3  61.8  60.9
Greece  All (15-64)  54.1  54.4  54.9  54.8  54.9
Female (15-64)  43.2  44.3  45.8  46.0  48.2
Ireland  All (15-64)  52.3  53.8  54.8  56.1  59.8
Female (15-64)  46.9  47.0  48.8  49.7  52.1
Italy  All (15-64)  50.9  50.5  50.6  50.5  50.8
Female (15-64)  42.2  42.5  43.3  43.6  43.9
Luxemburg  All (15-64)  60.2  58.5  59.1  59.9  60.2
Female (15-64)  47.0  44.1  45.7  47.1  47.6
Netherlands  All (15-64)  36.0  34.2  66.2  68.1  69.8
Female (15-64)  57.3  59.1  60.2  61.9  62.9
Portugal  All (15-64)  62.9  62.5  62.3  63.4  66.8
Female (15-64)  58.8  59.1  59.5  60.3  61.9
Spain  All (15-64)  46.5  47.4  48.2  49.4  51.2
Female (15-64)  45.4  46.2  47.0  48.0  48.7
Sweden  All (15-64)  71.5  72.2  71.6  70.7  71.5
Female (15-64)  77.0  77.2  77.1  76.3  75.5
United States  All (15-64)  76.7  76.9  77.1  77.4  77.4
Female (15-64)  69.4  69.7  70.1  70.7  70.7
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1999)
57Annex II. Constructing the Employment Protection Legislation Index.
Since  the  late  1980s,  the  OECD  has  been  interested  in  analyzing  the  relationship  betwteen
employment protection  legislation (EPL)  and labor market  flexibility  (and performance).  While, the
first  round  of studies  used an  EPL  index  based  solely  on  permanent  and  temporary  employment
regulation,  this  index was  later updated  to  account  for  regulation  concerning  collective  dismissals.
The methodology described  here corresponds to the most recent version of the EPL index.
This index is constructed as a weighted average  of 22 different  indicators describing various aspects
of both permanent  and temporary  employment,  as  well  as collective  dismissals.  Although  some  of
these  indicators  are readily  available  from  the  country's  labor code  (e.g.  notice  period,  severance
payment,  maximum  duration  of temporary  contracts),  most  of them  need  to  be  constructed  using
different sources of information, together with some subjective aggregation  method.
Table All. 1 contains  a detailed  description of all 22 indicators classified  in three groups (level  3): (i)
indicators describing legislation for regular of permanent contracts (RC), (ii) indicators  capturing the
nature  of temporary employment  legislation  (TC), and (iii) indicators  for the strictness  of collective
dismissal  procedures  (CD). These  broad  groups  can then  be broken  up into more  narrowly  defined
sub-groups  (level 2). For instance, when  looking at temporary employment  legislation, indicators for
the nature and characteristics  of fixed-term  contracts (TC I)  and temporary  work  agencies (TC2)  are
considered  separately.  Finally, each subgroup may contain one or more individual  indicators,  such as
"Valid cases other than objective"  (TC IA) and "Maximum  number of successive contracts"  (TC  1B)
in the case of fixed-term  contracts legislation  (level  1).
Table AII.I Employment Protection Index:  Selection  of Indicators and Weighting Scheme
Level  4  Level  3  Level  2  Level  I
RC1  Procedures  (1/2)
Procedural
Inconveniences  (1/3)  Delay to start a notice  (1/2)
RC  9 months  (1/7)
Regular  RC2  Notice  period after  4 years  (1/7)
contracts  Notice and severance  20 years  (1/7)
(5/12)  pay for no-fault individual  9 months  (4/21)
dismissals (1/3)  Severance pay after  4 years  (4/21)
20 years  (4/21)
RC3  Definition of unfair dismissal  (1/4)
EPL  Overall  Difficulty of dismissal (1/3)  trial period  (1/4)
Summary Indicator  compensation  (1/4)
reinstatement  (1/4)
TC  TCI  valid cases other than  objective  (1/2)
Temporary  Fixed-term  contracts (1/2)  max number of successive  contracts  (1/4)
contracts  max cumulated  duration  (1/4)
(5/12)  TC2  types of work for which is legal  (1/2)
Temnporary Work  Agency  restrictions  on number of renewal  (1/4)
(1/2)  max cumulated duration  (1/4)
definition of collective  dismissal  (1/4)
CD Collective  Dismissals (2/12)  additional notification  requirements  (1/4)
additional delays involved  (1/4)
other special costs to employers  (1/4)
This classification  is rather important,  since the EPL methodology relies heavily on  it to move from
the individual indicators to the overall index. In particular,  the EPL calculation  is organized  in 3  steps,
58each  of them aggregating  information  from  one  level to the next  (e.g.  level  1=:>  level  2,  level  2 =>
level 3, etc.) and using a different set of weights (in parentheses in Table All. 1).
It  is  important  to  notice  that  different  indicators  are  expressed  in  different  units,  making
standardization necessary in order to aggregate them in a comprehensive manner. For this purpose, all
indicators are re-scaled  according using a common  ranking,  from 'O' (very flexible legislation) to '6'
(very strict legislation),  in the way described  in Table AII.2 below.
Table AII.2 Employment Protection  Index: Conversion into a Common Scale
Code  Original  0  1  2  3  4  5  6
Unit
Individual dismissals
RCIA  Scale 0-3  Scale (0-3)*2
RCIB  Days  0-2  <10  < 18  <26  <35  <45  245
RC2AI  Months  0  ￿  0.4  ￿  0.8  ￿  1.2  < 1.6  < 2  Ž  2
RC2A2  Months  0  S 0.75  S 1.25  < 2  < 2.5  < 3.5  Ž  3.5
RC2A3  Months  <3  ￿  2.75  ￿  5  ￿  7  s 9  >11  <11
RCBI  Months  0  ￿0.5  1  I  S  1.75  S2.5  <3  23
RCB2  Months  0  ￿  0.5  I  S 2  s 3  < 4  2 4
RCB3  Months  0  ￿  3  s 6  S10  S  12  ￿18  > 18
RC3A  Scale 0-3  Scale (0-3)*2
RC3B  Months  2 24  > 12  >9  > 5  > 2.5  > 1.5  < 1.5
RC3C  Months  ￿13  <8  ￿12  S18  S24  ￿30  >30
RC3D  ScaleO-3  Scale (0-3)*2
Temporary dismissals
TCIA  Scale 0-3  Scale (0-3)*2
TCIB  Number  No limit  Ž  5  2 4  2 3  Ž2  2  1.5  < 1.5
TCIC  Months  No limit  236  230  224  Ž18  Ž12  <12
TC2A  Scale 0-4  Scale (0-4)*6/4
TC2B  Yes/no  No  Yes or TC2A=O
TC2C  Months  No limit  Ž36  Ž 24  Ž 18  Ž 12  > 6  S 6 or TC2A=O
Collective dismissals
CDI  Scale 0-4  Scale (0-4)*6/4
CD2  Scale 0-2  Scale (0-2)*3
CD3  Days  0  < 25  <30  <50  < 70  < 90  > 90
CD4  Scale 0-2  Scale (0-2)*3
In sum, the EPL index is constructed as follows:
- Calculation of individual indicators (see Tables AII.3-AII.5  below)
- Re-scaling of individual indicators using the conversion presented  in Table AII.2
- Aggregation in 3  steps from levels 1 to 4 using the weights described in Table All. 1.
As  a result of this methodology,  the countries  with very  flexible  employment protection  regulation
have a low overall EPL index (close to 0  or 1), and those with very strict legislation  will have a high
index (close to 5 or 6).
59Table AII.3 EPL Index: Dismissal Regulation for Permanent Employees (12 indicators).
Source:  OECD Employment Outlook (1999),  Labor Code of Estonia, Labor Code of Slovenia (current  and proposed), and  Labor Code of Slovakia.
I/ All  indicators  based on proposed Labor Code.
Regular procedures  Notice and severance  pay for 'no-fault'  individuals  Difficulty of dismissal
Notice period after  Severance pay after  Definition of unfair  Trial period
Procedure  Delay to start of notice  9m  4y  20y  9m  4y  20y  dismissal  before eligibility Compen-
Scale 0 to 3  Days  Months
Czech Republic  2.0  7.0  2.0  2.5  2.5  1.0  1.0  1.0  2.0  3.0  8.0  2.0
Estonia  2.0  1.0  2.0  2.0  4.0  2.0  2.0  4.0  1.5  1.0  6.0  3.0
Hungary  1.0  13.0  1.0  1.2  3.0  0.0  1.0  5.0  0.0  3.0  10.0  2.0
Poland  2.0  13.0  1.0  3.0  3.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  3.0  2.0
Slovakia  1.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0  6.0  3.0
Slovenia  2.0  9.0  6.0  6.0  6.0  0.0  2.0  10.0  2.5  2.0  10.0  3.0
Slovenia  2.0  9.0  1.0  2.0  4.0  0.0  0.8  6.7  2.0  1.3  12.0  2.0
60Table AII.4 EPL Index: Regulation of Temporary Forms of Employment  (6 indicators).
................  . . ..........................  .. ..Fixed-Term  ContractsTemporary
Valid reasons for use  Types  of activities  for  Maximum
other than  Maximum number of  Maximum  which agency  can be  Restriction on  accumulated duration
'temporary activity"  consecutive  contracts  accumulated duration  hired  renewals  of contracts
Scale 0-3  Number  Months  Scale 0-4  Yes/No  Months
Czech Republic  2.5  no limit  no limit  4  No  No limit
Estonia  1.0  no limit  60  4  No  No limit
Hungary  2.5  no limit  60  4  No  No limit
Poland  3.0  2  no limit  4  Yes  No limit
Slovakia  1.0  no limit  36  4  No  No limit
Slovenia  1.0  no limit  no limit  I  No  2 months
Slovenia2 2.5  no limit  36  4  No  No limit
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1999), Estonian  Labor Code, Slovene  current and proposed Labor Codes, Slovak Labor Code.
1/  Temporary activities  include specific projects,  seasonal work,  replacement of temporarily  absent permanent workers  (on sickness and maternity leave),  and exceptional
workload
2/ Based on proposed law.
61Table AII.5 EPL Index: Procedures and Standards for Collective Dismissals (4 indicators).
Definition of collective  dismissal Additional notiflcation requirements Additional delays  involved Other special costs  to employers
Scale  0-4  Scale 0-2  ays  Scale  0-2
Czech Republic  4  2  83  0
Estonia  3  2  46  1
Hungary  3  2  47  0
Poland  3  1  32  2
Slovakia  2  2  60  1.5
Slovenia  3  2  60  1.5
Slovenia"  4  2  45  1.5
Source: OECD  Employment Outlook (1999),  Estonian Labor Code,  Slovene current and proposed  Labor Codes, and Slovak Labor Code.
I/ Based on proposed code.
62Annex III. Trade Unions and Collective  Bargaining in the EU Accession  Countries.
*  The Czech Republic
There are currently two main trade unions, and two main employer associations in the country. All of
them operate on the basis of  free association; that is, agreements signed between unions and employer
associations are only binding for union workers and firms belonging to the employer association (i.e.
if a firm disagrees with a certain industry-level  agreement,  it is free to leave the employer association
and ignore such agreement).
Labor unions in the Czech Republic  are very weak,  with the exception of those in sectors where the
presence of public  enterprises is  still substantial.  As a consequence,  union coverage is limited,  with
only 30% of the work force being covered by the 1,222 collective  agreements signed in  1998, and the
number of new unions in privatized and new companies is low.
Wage bargaining  occurs  at multiple levels.  First a tripartite  body, composed of representatives from
trade  unions,  employer  associations,  and  the  Ministry  of Labor  and  Social  Affairs,  determines
aggregate  wage  growth  and  basic  working  conditions  (provided  the  government  is  willing  to
participate  in  the  negotiations).  Second,  there  are  industry-  and  firm-level  negotiations  between
employers  and  unions.  During  these,  however,  wages  are  de facto set  by  employers,  with  the
exception of the public where negotiations must comply with a pre-set wage grid.
Finally,  although  initially the  tripartite  body was responsible  for the determination  of the minimum
wage,  since  the  mid-1990s  adjustments  are  made  unilaterally  by  the  ministry  of  Labor  when
considered necessary.
*  Estonia
During the 1990s, union membership declined  in Estonia from almost 100 to 30%. This decrease was
mainly due to the privatization  process, together with the increasing importance of small  and foreign
firms, where union presence is generally weak. In addition, the bulk of economic  activity shifted from
manufacturing, where traditionally unions were strong, to services.
The  level  of coordination  among  employers  is  not high  either.  They  are  represented,  only  on  a
voluntary  basis,  by  a  single  employer  association  that  covers  around  6,000  firms  or  200,000
employees  (out of a total  of approximately  640,200). As  a consequence  of the weakness  of social
partners, the government plays a major role in shaping  industrial relations, the basis of which are then
laws rather than agreements.
Both  unions  and employers  are  invited  to participate  in the  design of such  laws  through  tripartite
negotiations.  Discussions,  however,  focus  on  working  conditions  rather  than  wages.  These  are
generally determined unilaterally by the employers, at the firm level, or by the government in the case
of public-sector workers.
*  Hungary
After transition,  trade unions have  been mainly relegated to operate  in newly-privatized  state firms,
since they have  gained little representation  in new companies.  This implies that unions are  strong in
heavy industries and weak in the expanding service sector.
63General  economic policy issues and  labor matters are discussed  in two different  forums.  The first is
the  Economic  Council,  a  consultative body  composed  of different  or  iizations  including  trade
unions  and  employer  organizations,  multinational  investors,  the Hungariaii  National  Bank  and the
Hungarian  government.  The  second  forum  is  the National  Labor  Council,  a  tripartite  council  for
consultation  and negotiation  on labor issues  including employment legislation,  industrial relations and
social policy, training, wages, work-place  safety regulations,  etc.
Although  the  National  Labor  Council  is  also  empowered  to set  the  national  minimum  wage and
recommend  wage  increases,  centralized  collective  bargaining  has  never  been  very  important  in
Hungary.  Wage  deregulation  had  began  already  before  the transition,  and  during  the privatization
period most private-sector wages became  freely negotiable  at the industry- and firm-level.  Hence, it is
only in the  public sector, regulated  through a strict wage tariff system, that  some form of collective
bargaining is still binding.
*  Poland
Unlike  its  Central  European  neighbors,  one  of Poland's  labor  market  main  features  is  the  large
number  of labor  organizations  that  operate  in  it.  Trade  unions  and  other employee  organizations,
which  started and accelerated  the transition process,  still play an important  role.  Currently, the two
most  important trade  union confederations  are  Solidarity  and  the  Organization  of Post-Communist
Trade  Unions (OPZZ),  but there  are also another nine  smaller nationwide union confederations,  273
national  trade  union  organizations,  and  about  24,000  local  trade  unions,  organized  by  enterprise,
industry, or region. Similarly, there are more than  1,000 employer organizations  across the country.
Unions enjoy by law extensive  power in the areas of worker rights, wage policy, and social benefits.
In contrast they have no control over managerial decisions regarding company strategy and ownership
transformations.  A  fact  that  in  the  past  has  led  them  to  initiate  numerous  strikes  to  express
dissatisfaction  with the privatization  process. In the last few years, constant growth in the numbers of
small and medium enterprises  (e.g.  90%  of all  firms outside the agriculture  sector have five  or fewer
employees,  and 89% of these are sole proprietorships)  has eroded  union power,  so that most of their
current  activity is concentrated  in large,  heavy industry firms yet to be privatized.  This has led many
to blame  unions for the inefficiencies that plague these large enterprises.
Since  1995,  industrial  relations  are  organized  through  the  Tripartite  Commission,  which  includes
representatives  of the  government,  employers  associations  and  trade  unions.  Other  smaller,  more
localized  organizations  - composed  of  trade  unions,  local  government  officials,  employers
associations  and  groups of unemployed  workers  - serve  as consultative  and  advisory bodies  to the
heads of general administrative organs.
Wages negotiations between employers and workers can take place at the industry and the firm levels.
However,  collective  agreements  can be adopted  only when a union  is present.  This  implies that, in
practice,  collective  agreements  cover  mostly  state-owned  or big  privatized  companies,  rather  than
newly created  private  firms.  As a  consequence,  the average  pay  in the  public  sector  has  remained
significantly higher than that in the private sector during the last decade.
64*  Slovakia
Union coverage  is fairly extensive  in Slovakia. Moreover,  unions play an important role in the design
of industrial  relations since the Employment Act (1997)  stipulates that they be represented as a social
partner  at all levels of the National Labor Office and its organs. The Confederation  of Trade Unions,
composed  of 42  independent  groups,  is the  largest  union,  while the two  most important  employer
organizations  are the Association of Employers  and the Association of the Slovak Republic,  with 27
member organizations.
Slovakia adopted a tripartite system to regulate  labor and industrial  affairs in  1990. For this purpose,
the Council of Economic and Social Agreement  was created,  comprising  a total of 21  representatives
from trade unions,  employer  associations  and the  government.  Among  other functions,  the  Council
decides on the minimum wage and the Minimum Living Standard (i.e. poverty line), and further wage
negotiations  are  conducted  at  the  industry  and  firn  level.  Such  negotiations,  as  well  as  the
organization of strikes, are regulated through the Act on Collective Bargaining.
*  Slovenia
There  are  130  national  trade  unions  in  Slovenia  operating  along  industrial  and  occupational  lines.
Although  there  are  no  official  figures  on  membership,  21  out  of these  130  unions  are  considered
'representative'  (i.e.  membership  represents  at  least  15%  of  all  employees  in  the  particular
industry/occupation  the  union  operates  in).  Employers,  on  the  other  hand,  are  organized  in  three
different associations, and their interests are also represented by the Chamber of Commerce, to which
membership is compulsory.
According  to  the  current  labor  legislation,  collective  agreements  are  a  main  instrument  for
determining  specific  rights and duties between  employers and employees.16 Consultations  occur first
at the national  level,  resulting  in (i)  a  collective  agreement  for the  private  sector which  determines
base wages  and  adjustment  factors  for 26  industries  and  9 educational  levels,  and  (ii)  a collective
agreement for the non-market  sector. Both agreements constitute the basis for all other contracts, thus
limiting wage variation  across industries and firms.
In  addition,  social  dialogue  is also organized  around  the Economic  and  Social  Council,  founded  in
1994.  This  is a national  tripartite consultative  body of fifteen  representatives,  five from each of its
three  members  (the  government,  trade  unions  and  employers).  The  Council  provides
recommendations  concerning  legislation,  such  as  compulsory  insurance  schemes  (old-age  and
disability  pensions,  social  welfare,  allowances),  employment,  labor relations,  collective  bargaining,
prices  and  taxes,  economic  policy,  etc.,  and  such  recommendations  are  then  submitted  to  the
Parliament.  The Council  also plays an  important role as a facilitator  of negotiations between  unions
and employer associations, helping them reach the agreements described above.
16  The proposed  new labor legislation will determine most of the rights of employees at a minimum  level, thus
the conclusion of collective agreements  will no longer be obligatory.  The  Law on Collective Agreements  is in
the process of  adoption:  the division into commercial and non-commercial  sectors will be replaced by a division
of profit and non-profit  sectors.
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